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Abstract
This paper is about the political economy of state control in the forestry sector of post-
Soviet Khabarovsk krai.  Following the breakup of the USSR in 1991, the Russian
Federation government began introducing policies to decentralize administrative and
management responsibility to the regions, with President Yeltsin famously urging the
regions to “take all the sovereignty you can swallow”.  In Khabrovsk krai, located on
Russia’s Pacific coast and adjacent to the expanding industrial timber markets of the
Pacific Rim, the provincial government took the President at his word and began
legislating provincial control over access, revenues, and management of the territorial
forest resources.  In the process, the provincial state challenged the administrative and
financial controls of local state bodies, the municipal governments and the district
branches of the Federal Forest Service.  This paper looks at the transformation of the
state in its multiple levels and associated powers, and seeks to explain the political
economic relationships of state power that prevail in the sector.  The paper first presents
the changing logic of codified authority in the krai forest sector between 1992 and 1998,
as legislated authority moved from Moscow to the municipalities and then to the
provincial state.  It then examines the tensions created among the different state
institutions as the result of these reforms, and the responses by the local state
institutions to counter the challenges to their fiscal and administrative autonomy.
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1. Introduction
The Russian Far East1 — the Pacific littoral of the Russian Federation — is a treasure
trove of natural riches, host to a wealth of minerals, oil, gas, and diamonds, and with
nearly unbroken taiga (boreal forest) covering 273 million mountainous hectares. This
natural wealth has persisted in the Russian Far East (RFE) long after the exhaustion of
similar storehouses elsewhere in the world, largely because until recently, it served as a
remote reserve supplementing existing stores closer to Soviet Russia’s main internal
markets; also because the Russian Far East remained closed to foreign exploitation
during the seventy years of Soviet rule. In 1991, with the breakup of the Soviet Union,
the Russian Federation government opened the borders and markets of the Russian Far
East to the global economy. Despite dramatic political and economic transformations
(including the demise of the redistributive party-state, policies of economic
liberalization and administrative decentralization, and the privatization of state property)
and its proximity to the industrial markets of the Pacific Rim, the resource-rich RFE has
not seen the dynamic processes of economic growth and competitive integration into
global markets that neoliberal theorists and Western economic advisors anticipated.
This paper is about the political economy of the Russian transition. It is not about the
transition to markets once hailed by expectant neoliberal reformers. Nor does it grant
attention to the important parallel transformation of the industrial enterprise sector.
Instead, it is about the Russian state’s transition from Socialism: the transformation of
the institutional capacity of the Soviet state, steered by its nomenclatura2 to appropriate
control over the public wealth within its territorial jurisdiction. I refer to the state not as
a structure or an undifferentiated whole, but rather as sets of institutions, social
processes, and relations that exist in, and reflect their social context (Verdery, 1996;
Hsing, 1998; Romm, 2000). The current Russian state is far from a monolithic whole
                                                
1
 The Russian Far East is defined here as including the territories on Russia’s Pacific frontier: the
Chukotka, Koriak and Yevreiskaia Augonomous okrugi, Khabarovsk and Primorskii kraii, the
Kamchatka, Magadan, Amur, Sakhalin, and Chita oblasti, as well as the inland Republic of Sakha
(Yakutia).
2
 Historically, nomenclatura refers to the system by which the Communist Party made appointments to
specified posts in the government or economic administration.
2and the transformation of its institutional relationships is taking place at all levels of its
vertical hierarchy – federal, krai (province), oblast (region), and raion (municipality or
district). Given the cascade of overlapping jurisdiction, tensions have developed among
the differentiated state's interests over who gets to control of what, under what
conditions, and with what returns. The transitional state is negotiating — or battling —
across its own internal boundaries, and the resulting political economy is characterized
by a many-layered fragmented state with multiple logics, interests, and strategies.
What does it mean to control public wealth in post-Soviet Russia?  In Khabarovsk Krai,
located on Russia’s Pacific coast, rich in timber, fish, and mineral stores and in close
proximity to the industrialized Pacific Rim markets, control over the public wealth
means control over the region’s raw material resources. Here, eight time zones east of
the political center of Russia, proximity translates readily into control. Territorially-
based administrators are central to decisions on access, terms of use, the distribution of
revenues, and devise the regulations governing the exploitation of the public resources.
In addition, however, baseline terms are set by Moscow. The federal state requires
regional political allegiance and a share of the returns from territorial wealth in
exchange for the regional governments’ autonomous control at home (Castells and
Kiselyova, 2000). In other resource-rich territories of the RFE, governors have
bargained with Moscow for greater economic control over their region’s raw material
resources. Some have bargained successfully, such as the diamond-rich Sakha Republic;
others less so, like the six gubernatorial parties to the 1993 Siberian Agreement. In
politically stable Khabarovsk Krai, Moscow is less concerned with political patronage
and more interested in the growing economic opportunities from foreign direct
investment and trade with the Pacific Rim and China. To this end, Moscow has assured
itself a share of the revenues from forest use and established federal ownership of
Russia’s forests, in light of 1997 federal forest legislation. In turn, the federal
government granted the Khabarovsk government relatively untethered control over the
raw material forest resources in their territory.
At the close of 1998, codified direct governance over access and exploitation of the
territorial forests sat squarely with the Khabarovsk administration. The krai allocates
long term forest leases, negotiates the terms, receives 60 percent of the revenues among
other incomes from forest use, and sets the administrative policy agenda. But in the
process of legislating itself control, the krai has challenged the existing autonomy and
jurisdiction of the local-level state institutions. The municipal — raion —
administrations have “officially lost their funding, officially lost their jurisdiction, and
acquired new social responsibilities”, leaving them with much expanded but sorely
underfunded local social-economic mandates (Sheingauz, 1998a). Similarly, the district
branches of the Forest Service, the leskhoz, lost their financial independence, though not
to the krai as much as to the shift from state subsidies to the federal government’s
experiment with market-based allocation of forest fund resources. The krai’s
centralization of control reflects a direct conflict of interest among the federal,
provincial, and local state institutions, where the upper echelons of the state hierarchy
have legitimized the expanded provincial control of the public natural resources at the
expense of local state institutions.  The political-economic tensions have prompted an
institutional flexibility at the local level as the raion and leskhoz persist in their prior
practical administrative and economic authority to govern forest use and the returns
from exploitation. The politicial-economic relationships of power that pertain in the
Khabarovsk forestry sector are not necessarily those codified by the provincial and
3federal leglislative reforms, but are more often localized, relative relationships of power
held by the local state authorities and practiced at the local level, as they continue to
govern access and control over the forest fund resources in their territorial purview.
This paper looks at the transformation of the state in its multiple locations and
associated powers, and seeks to explain these political-economic relationships of state
power that prevail in the sector.  To this end, we can consider the state institutions in
terms of the decisions they have made. What is the logic of control over raw material
wealth; which state institutions control what, under what conditions, and why? What is
the logic of regional negotiations with the Kremlin; what must the provincial state
concede to Moscow in exchange for regional economic and administrative autonomy?
And what are the implications of change in the control over public wealth; where state
interests are not compatible and tensions develop among the different levels, what is the
logic of infighting among them?3 By examining the formal and informal processes of
institutional change, and the competitive and differentiated responses by interdependent
state institutions, we can get a sense of the political-economic relationships of (formal
and informal) state power that prevail in the post-Soviet forestry sector of Russia’s
easternmost territory.
The role of the state is not the only influence on the organization (and development) of
the forestry sector; there are internal and external economic, political, and social forces
that also shape the activities in the sector. The state, however, is central in setting the
context for the participation and practice by industrial forest users in the sphere of
forestry, especially foreign capital investment. And in Khabarovsk the formal and
informal transformation of the states’ institutional authority has created the context for
the arrival of foreign direct investment in the forestry sector and the krai’s much-
anticipated integration into the global markets of the Pacific Rim. The results are
manifested in a system of resource use and management characterized by diffuse
locations of state power, overlapping jurisdiction, flexible rules and regulations,
negotiations at every level of decision-making, and a labyrinth of relative power
relationships that govern the processes of participation in the Khabarovsk forestry
sector.
The paper is presented in three sections. The first section presents some theoretical
context for questions of the state’s transition from Socialism and the flexibility of social
institutions to accommodate political and economic change in their efforts to protect
their access to productive resources. The second section presents the changing logic —
and location — of codified state controls in the Khabarovsk Krai forestry sector
between 1992 and 1998, as legislated authority moved from Moscow to the
municipalities, and then to the provincial state. The third section examines the tensions
created among the different state institutions as the result of these reforms and the
response by local state institutions to counter the challenges to their fiscal and
administrative independence.
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 Thanks are due to Manuel Castells for this analytical framework.
42. Institutional Transition from Socialism:
Some Theoretical Approaches
There is an expansive literature on the processes and directions of the post-Soviet
transition from socialism. Among the earliest voices in the transition debate were those
of the neoliberal theorists and policy advisors who engaged the newly independent
Russian Federation in a normative quest to “liberate the market”. Neoliberal theories of
economic transformation begin from the premise that free-market capitalism will follow
inevitably on the dissolution of the central party-state and introduction of private
property rights (Nee, 1989, 1996; Sachs and Woo, 1994; Aslund, 1994). As Stark and
Bruszt (1998:5) put it, “the (neoliberal) road to an advanced capitalist economy is the
same road, regardless of the starting point”. Markets will gradually replace state
bureaucracies in reallocating surplus, rewarding productivity rather than political loyalty
(Nee, 1996), and economic reforms will smooth the transition from the redistributive
economy of shortage, stagnation, inefficiency, and “plan bargaining” (Kornai, 1992;
Jowitt, 1992) to idealized Western free-market systems of dynamic efficiency,
technological innovation, stability, and economic growth.
Other literature on the post-Soviet transition takes exception to this assumed linearity of
change and the contextual blinders of static recipes for economic reform. In addition to
the shortcomings of systematic blueprints for institutional change, neoliberalism abides
by “the myth of starting from scratch” (Stark and Bruszt, 1998), assuming that the
collapse of communism left an institutional void in the post-Soviet economic system.
Instead, critics of neoliberalism argue, some processes of the transition are deeply
embedded in social and economic relationships that have their roots in the Soviet-era
bureaucracy (Jowitt, 1983, 1992; Walder, 1996; Szelenyi and Kostello, 1996; Verdery,
1996).
Among these critial voices, Walder (1986, 1996) brings Jowitt’s (1983, 1992) concept
of “neotraditionalism” (where Communist Party apparatchiki4 personalize the status and
power of their office) into the post-Soviet period. Walder asks whether “cadres are able
to develop new sources of power — not as redistributors but as regulators, brokers,
middlemen… managers or consultants… all through drawing on influence, knowledge,
and connections developed in previous years of power” (Walder, 1996). Writing on the
privatization of state enterprises, Verdery (1996) captures this same transposition of
institutionalized public authority and associated political networks to personalized,
privatized market power with her concept of “entrepratchiks” as the combination of
“entrepreneur” and “apparatchik”. Stark and Bruszt (1998) characterize this
privatization of public power as “nomenclatura buyouts”, and Staniszkis (in Verdery,
1996) writes about the transportability of “political capital”. Walder and others thus see
the state nomenclatura changing from bureaucratic to managerial, making a smooth
transition from the public to the private sector — same individuals, same organizations
and offices, same networks of relationships — but now in the context of the private
sector marketplace rather than the public realm of the state.
You-tien Hsing (1998), writing about economic decentralization in China, approaches
the transition from an altogether different perspective and looks at the transformation of
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 Apparatchiki are Party bureaucrats or operatives.
5the state within the state.  Instead of focusing on the extension of bureaucrats’ public
sector rights into the private sector, she writes about the transformation of local state
bureaucrats into entrepreneurial agents drumming up deals for the state. “China’s new
economic decentralization policies have not led to a full-fledged privatization or market
economy”, she writes, but rather to “the increasing autonomy of local governments and
the bureaucrats’ direct involvement in local accumulation” (Hsing, 1998). In this, Hsing
offers a compelling framework for thinking about the post-Soviet state’s transition and
its efforts to capitalize on the public wealth in an increasingly open environment of
economic exchange.  Like her “bureaucratic entrepreneurs”, in post-Soviet Khabarovsk
I found competitive local state institutions with control over key economic resources
such as access to raw materials, and administrative and financial regulatory authority.
But in Khabarovsk, a large measure of fiscal sovereignty and administrative powers that
rest with the local state institutions is informal and unsanctioned by larger political and
economic reforms from above. State-based control of public assets and accumulation is
not a coordinated affair; instead, it is internally competitive with multiple state logics,
interests, and strategies to realize them.
In such conditions, some institutions win and others get flexible. Hsing frames this and
the situation in Khabarovsk when she writes, “There is a multilayered power dynamic
among different jurisdictions, among different agencies of the same jurisdiction. Reform
coalitions or competition in the newly opened market could happen among provinces,
between province and subregional agencies,… Decentralization is practiced in various
forms. It is best understood as a process of negotiation and bargaining between the
central and local governments, combined with the flexible local interpretation and
adaptation of centrally imposed politics” (Hsing, 1998).
Sara Berry’s work (1989, 1993) on agrarian transitions in post-colonial Africa is a solid
theoretical accompaniment to Hsing’s work, arguing that social institutions are flexible
and their renegotiation is pervasive as actors try to maintain their access to productive
resources in response to political and economic change. Transformation of social
institutions in transitional societies is a fluid and interdependent process, the product of
influences from different and overlapping social arenas. As a result, we should expect
flexible processes of change, not linearity, as new institutions and relationships emerge
to fill in where an old social order has collapsed or been otherwise transformed (Berry,
1989). “People seek access to new sources of wealth and power through existing
institutional channels and use their newfound wealth and influence in ways which serve
to restructure old institutions and social relations rather than to destroy them” (Berry,
1989). Where Berry is writing about individuals manipulating existing socal institutions
to serve their interest in maintaining control of productive private resources, in
Khabarovsk, we are seeing the multiple state institutions — via their own nomenclatura
— seeking to expand their slice of control over the productive raw material resources in
their territory.
63. The Changing Logic of Control
3.1 Devolution from the Center:
“Take all the sovereignty you can swallow”
Following the disintegration of the USSR in September 1991, the government of the
Russian Federation began introducing policies to decentralize administrative and
management responsibility to regional and local district administrations, sharply
reducing long-standing centralized economic support to the regions. Shrinking
governmental subsidies to the Russian Far East in energy, transportation, capital
investment, social services, and the military industry had a catastrophic effect on the
economic system of the entire region (Moltz, 1996, p. 182). Overnight, Khabarovsk
Krai lost its Soviet-era industrial markets in European Russia and the USSR’s Central
Asian Republics, as newly unsubsidized production and transportation costs made RFE
forest products uneconomic in domestic markets as far as 6000 kilometers to the west.
At about the same time, central state programs promoting the privatization of state
enterprises and liberalization of trade prompted the partial or total privatization of most
of the krai’s 32 state forest industrial enterprises. Hundreds of new firms for the harvest
and export of Khabarovsk timber sprang up as entrepreneurs and the new owners of
former state enterprises anticipated hard currency and profits from neighboring Pacific
Rim markets. For the most part, however, neither the new private nor the former-state
enterprises were able to capitalize on the opportunity, given their obsolete
infrastructural and insufficient technological capacity to meet international standards in
the Pacific Rim markets.
With the collapse of the Soviet-era planned economic system, the Khabarovsk
administration found its forest sector with rising costs of production, absent competitive
production infrastructure, collapsed domestic markets, losing money from unregulated
timber trade with the Pacific Rim countries, and no unifying provincial policy on either
harvest or export activities Antonova and Mabel (1998, p. 6). From 1990 to 1994,
production of commercial timber fell from 11 million cubic meters per year to less than
3 million cubic meters per year, and forestry’s share of industrial production in the krai
fell from 12 to 8.5 percent. Sheingauz et al., (1996) remarked on the untimely
disconnect between RFE capacity and international opportunity: “Such a crisis is
leading to distressing losses for the entire forests of the region… Simultaneously, the
value of forest resources and its products continues to grow in Pacific Rim countries”.
The administration had “doubts as to whether the forest sector (had) sufficient energy to
address the challenging goal of acting as a catalyst for regional development”
(Sheingauz et al., 1996). Against these doubts, however, was the krai’s proximity to the
timber markets of Japan, Korea and China which, when combined with the post-Soviet
policies of openness in international trade and investment, presented expanded
opportunities for economic integration into Northeast Asia. In the early 1990s, then, the
krai administration turned to international timber trade as one way to rebuild and
reorient the regional forest economy (Sheingauz et al., 1996; Pominov, 1998, p. 66). To
do so, the provincial government would need direct control over the development and
direction of the industry and in revenues generated by the trade, responsibilities long
7held — and only recently and incompletely relinquished — by Moscow (Efremov et al.,
1996, p. 13).
Independent regional initiatives to govern industry were not an option during the Soviet
era. With the collapse of the centrally planned economic system, however, regional
initiatives for administrative independence were actively solicited by Moscow. In a
1990 radio address, Russian President Boris Yeltsin advised the fishermen of
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii, on the Kamchatka Peninsula:
“There is no point in counting on investment by the center because the
economy is now being decentralized and property is being denationalized,
so there will be nowhere to obtain such subsidies, since most of the
resources will be in the hands of the producer. You, the fishermen, oilmen,
and all the others who work and live here, must decide what this is to entail.
(You) will be given the independence to take your own decisions on
organizing joint ventures and organizing small enterprises” (FBIS-SOV-90-
172, 1991).
In 1992, the President extended this invitation to the provincial governments, urging
them to “take all the sovereignty you can swallow”. Laws on the books provided no
guidance in this direction, being holdovers from the former USSR and the RSFSR
(Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republics): strictly centralized and oriented
toward social and economic systems organized from Moscow. Soviet-era laws were
largely normative without enforcement mechanisms, addressing only a small portion of
forest management activities, with little or no accounting for the disparity in regional
social, economic, or environmental characteristics.  Russia-wide reforestation schedules
and volumes were dictated from Moscow, for instance, despite the country’s diversity of
climactic seasons and the tremendous variation in area and ecology managed by the
district forest service offices over Russia’s one billion hectares of taiga (Efremov et al.,
1996, p. 13). Soviet-era forest management was legislated to maximize its extractive
potential with an eye toward “continuous harvest” of timber resources, a far cry from
growing calls in post-Soviet Russia to recognize the broader ecological and economic
services provided by the taiga resources. In addition, laws on the books did not question
the issue of forest resource ownership — the State and the People owned the Forest
Fund.5  Ownership of natural resources was of increasing interest to the provincial
governments in the forest-rich regions of the Russian Far East: Given that they now had
administrative responsibility for them, many governors wondered, shouldn’t they also
have ownership? And yet, Soviet-era laws still on the books were “completely
conforming to the (party) ideology, with orders specific to the planned centralized
economy” (Efremov et al., 1999). Given the social and economic reforms with a market
orientation, officials from the krai administration declared these laws to be “absolutely
unusable” (Efremov et al., 1996, p. 13).
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 The State Forest Fund (Gosudarstvennyi Lesnoy Fund) is an official Russian term denoting federal
government-owned forest and non-forest lands that are managed by the authorized federal forest
management agencies, primarily by the Federal Forest Service of Russia. Forest fund lands are akin to
National Forest lands in the United States. About 60% of Russia’s total land base, and more than 90% of
Khabarovsk, belongs to this fund (World Bank, 1996, p. 27, footnote 1; Cholyshev and Abe, 1997, p. 2).
8The Khabarovsk administration was eager to take the President at his word. Within a
year of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the krai administration began issuing
provincial normative acts to regulate forest resource use and payments systems,
introducing competitive mechanisms to allocate access to forest resources, and creating
administrative bodies to implement the new legislation (Sekhin and Vachaeva, 1998;
Sheingauz et al., 1996, p. 13; Efremov et al., 1996, p. 13). From 1992 to 1998, the
provincial administration granted itself increasing controls over forest industrial activity
within its territorial borders. According to a collaborative paper by provincial
administrative officials within the krai:
“An important goal (of these initiatives) is the formation of the legal basis
for the economic grounds of forest use, which is connected with the
following three main reasons: (1) forest management still does not agree
with the new economic relations; (2) forest resources should become a
significant source of income for the krai’s population, and may facilitate the
solution of both economic, and primarily, social issues; (3) all
environmental and some social problems of forest use have been caused
exclusively by economic activities, and only through the economic activities
can they be solved” (Efremov et al., 1996, p. 25).
The krai level, post-Soviet, forest legislative acts are numerous (see Appendix). Those
initiatives of greatest consequence for increasing provincial control over the forest
resources are those that created provincial-level institutions with state-sanctioned
governance authority, and which reordered flows of resource control and revenues
through the krai administration. In the process of codifying authority at the provincial
level, however, the krai challenged the existing political-economic autonomy and
jurisdiction held by other state institutions — the municipal (raion) administrations and
the Federal Forest Service’s provincial office and district branches (leskhoz). The
resulting tensions have fostered a local institutional flexibility and persistence as the
competing state institutions seek to maintain their administrative and fiscal autonomy to
govern forest use in their territorial jurisdiction.
The next section presents an abbreviated view of the evolution of codified control over
the forestry sector between 1992 and 1998, illustrating the logic of negotiations with
Moscow and the changing location of control, as independent authority governing the
forest resources and their returns was relocated first from Moscow to the raiony, and
then to a shared jurisdiction, splitting ownership and control between the federal
government and the krai administration, respectively.
3.2 The Evolution and Relocation of State Authority
from 1992 to 1998
The krai’s centralizing initiatives written before 1993 are markedly different than those
written after. The earlier legislative acts were drafted broadly in an effort to make up for
the absence of regional guidance from the federal center. Provincial acts adopted after
the federal government’s 1993 passage of the Fundamentals of Federal Forest
Legislation have been directed more specifically toward filling the gaps where federal
laws and regulations fail to elaborate mechanisms for implementation or to account for
regional specificity and circumstance (Sheingauz et al., 1996, p. 13).
9There are a number administrative initiatives that stand out as explicit in expanding the
krai’s authority in the forest industrial sector. The first, the 1992 Regulation on Forest
Use Procedures in Khabarovsk Krai, was largely superseded by the federal forest
legislation in the year following its adoption, but is notable because it established a
basis for future krai and federal forest legislation. Subsequent initiatives of continuing
influence include (2) the creation of the Krai Commission on Forest Use, a provincial
decision-making body to allocate forest fund land for long term lease; (3) the creation of
a Department of Natural Resources and Extractive Industries Management, within
which is a Division of Forest Industry; the first creates policy and strategy for the
development of the industry in the krai, and the second implements and manages that
strategy; (4) a krai-level Certification Commission which certifies forest users for the
use of forest lands in the province; (5) the creation of provincial legislation establishing
the system of payments and distribution of revenue from forest use; (6) the adoption of
the krai’s own Forest Law, and (7) restructuring of the forestry enterprises indebted to
the krai, absolving their debt in return for a controlling state interest in the enterprise.
The administration’s effort to extend its jurisdiction in the forest sector did not exist in a
federal policy vacuum, however. It was both helped and hindered by revisions to forest
policy at the federal level. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, federal forest policy
has been revised twice: once in 1993, as mentioned above, and again in 1997, creating a
changing context to which the krai initiatives were largely a response, occasionally a
challenge, and in some cases, essentially ignored.
3.2.1 1992 Regulation on Procedures for
Forest Use in Khabarovsk Krai
The first and most far reaching of the krai’s early initiatives was adopted in June 1992,
less than a year after the breakup of the USSR. The Regulations on Forest Use
Procedures in Khabarovsk Krai introduced a number of innovations to forest policy,
declaring provincial sovereignty over forest resources in the krai and instituting new
mechanisms for granting access to forest resources. The Regulations introduced the
concept of a license granting a forest user the right to lease forest lands. The license was
to be issued through a competitive process — open auctions or closed bidding — held
by the raion authorities in coordination with the management advice of the leskhoz. The
krai legislation also extended the legal grounds for leasing forest fund resources to
foreign entities.  Though much of the 1992 Regulations was largely superseded by the
1993 federal forest code, including the claim to provincial ownership, the krai law is
generally credited with forming the basis for elements of the 1993 federal code and the
krai’s own Forest Law adopted in December 1998. Box 1 presents the main points of
the 1992 Regulations.
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Box 1: Highlights of the 1992
Regulation on Forest Utilization in the Khabarovsk Krai Territory
• Forests and forest lands of Khabarovsk Krai are the property of its population and
constitute the economic basis for local social development.
• Privatization of krai forests is prohibited.
• Forest use is regulated by paid, limited-duration permits, such as concessions and
licenses, harvest permits and forest permits. Some mechanisms, such as concessions
and licenses, are to be allocated through market mechanisms such as open auctions
or closed tenders; others, such as harvest tickets and non-timber forest product tickets
are allocated by the leskhoz.
• A concession grants permission for overall utilization, and special permits are given
for specific activities.
• Subleasing by the forest users is permitted for land use and under-canopy resources,
but not for wood resources.
• Permits for forest use are available to any juridical or physical person, including
foreigners, who must be juridical persons.
• The society in the krai has the right to use the forest for recreation and other non-
wood functions.
• All loggers must get permits and must sign agreements with the local administration
in order to use the forest resources.
Source: Priamorski Vedomosti, 1992 July 4, 1992, in Sheingauz et al. (1995) Box 3, p. 8.
3.2.2 1993 Federal Forest Legislation
of the Russian Federation
In 1993, the Fundamentals of Forest Legislation of the Russian Federation was signed
into law by the President of the Russian Federation, and upon its adoption became the
highest level legislation governing forestry in the country (Sheingauz et al., 1995, p. 8;
Efremov et al., 1996, p. 7). For the most part, the Fundamentals was not a dramatic
departure from the Soviet-era laws that came before it, and significant sections of the
1993 Fundamentals were borrowed directly from the Soviet forest legislation of the
1970s, leaving administrative power still concentrated with the central authorities
(Sheingauz et al., 1995, p. 9). In its attempt to combine Soviet-era provisions and
accommodate Russia’s end to central planning, however, the Fundamentals was
criticized as internally inconsistent and, according to Sheingauz et al. (1996, p. 11), as
“in fact, a useless document”. Even so, the new legislation introduced a new system of
payment and competitive mechanisms for the allocation of forest resources.
Prior to the Fundamentals, in the absence of specific legislative direction, raion
administrations assumed the right to allocate forest resources in their municipalities
(Efremov et al., 1996, p. 5). The Fundamentals sanctioned this practical authority and
expanded it to include setting concrete rates for short-term dues and long-term rental
payments, distributing licenses for forest use, and being the conduit and recipient of the
revenues earned from forest use in their districts (see Appendix, Box A1) (Sekhin, 1997,
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p. 2). Raion administrators allocated licenses in cooperation with the leskhoz, by closed
competitions, open auctions, or through direct negotiations (Article 28), though critics
in the krai administration complained that this last option was a “loophole for
bureaucratic arbitrariness and corruption of functionaries” (Sheingauz et al., 1996, p.
18). Forest dues were expanded beyond stumpage fees to include fees for harvest of
secondary forest products6 and the use of federal forest lands for cultural, recreation,
hunting, and tourist activities, with land use taxes incorporated into both dues and rental
costs (Articles 66, 68, and 71). Dues could be paid all at once or as regular payments
during the term of use, in cash, in kind, or as work or services, and payments went
directly to the raion budgets in whose territory the forest resources were located (Article
72) (Bardal, 1998, p. 11; Efremov et al., 1996, p. 11; Sheingauz et al., 1996, p. 12).
By granting these practical powers to the municipal administrations, the Fundamentals
countered the krai’s 1992 claim of provincial ownership of the territorial forest
resources and set back the krai’s efforts to establish its direct control over the forests.
That said, the Fundamentals also left the legislative door wide open for provincial co-
optation of nearly all of the municipality’s authority in the forest sector. Even as
Articles 28, 69, and 72 grant the raiony the authority to allocate licenses and organize
forest competitions, set concrete stumpage fees, and determine the distribution of rental
payments, each of these same Articles also allow the provincial administrations to
revise the rules and procedures governing these controlling mechanisms, in the process
overruling the municipalities’ jurisdiction; all options that the administration took
advantage of over the next two years. In the process, the krai almost entirely co-opted
the practical authority of the raiony to govern the territorial forest resources.
3.2.3 Krai Commission on Forest Use
The krai’s expanded governance of Khabarovsk’s forestry sector was most assertively
established by its 1994 creation of the Krai Commission on Forest Use. Created in
response to the Fundamentals’ call for joint forest management and administrative
responsibility between the Federal Forest Service and the subjects of the Russian
Federation (Articles 4 and 5), the Commission’s reach includes “making decisions,
proposals and conclusions concerning the management, disposal, permanent and
sustainable use of forest resources, granting (or revoking) forest sites for long term use
and solving other questions of forest use” (Section 1, Article 1). With this, the
Commission became the main agency for making final decisions on submitting forest
timber resources into lease, with the use of all provincial forest resources under its
authority (Sekhin, 1997, p. 1; Efremov et al., 1999, p. 11). (For responsibilities of the
Commission, see Appendix, Box A2.)
Chaired by the First Deputy Governor of the krai and subordinate only to the direct
authority of the Governor, the Commission primarily addresses the large scale and long
term lease of forest land for industrial harvest (areas of more than 2500 hectares or
harvest of more than 5000 cubic meters per year, for a period from 1 to 49 years). In
1996, the Commission allocated eleven lots totaling more than 380,000 hectares; in
1997, these numbers increased more than five-fold (see Table 1). Decisions on forest
                                                
6
 Secondary forest products could include the harvest of pitch, resin, hay, and fodder, as well as the
commercial harvest of tree sap, nectar, pollen, berries, mushrooms, medicinal plants, and beehives.
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use for less than a year, with volumes under 5000 cubic meters per year, or on areas less
than 2500 hectares, remained for the most part under the purview of the raion
administrations, with management advice from with the leskhoz.
Table 1. Dynamic of Forest Service Lots for Competition, Khabarovsk Krai
Index 1996 1997
Number of lots presented for competition 11 60
Total area (000 hectares) 384 2,095
Exploitable volumes (000 cubic meters) 18,659 90,857
Annual Allowable Cut (000 cubic meters 365 2,216
Source: Department of Natural Resources and Resource Extraction Industry, Khabarovskii Krai
Administration, 1998; Mikheeva (1999); Bardal (1998).
If there were earlier concerns about bureaucratic arbitrariness in the allocation of forest
fund land at the hands of the municipal authorities, they were not dispelled by the
transfer of bureaucratic authority up to the Commission. In 1998, the Bulletin of the
Russian National Academy of Sciences reported that “more often than not, the land
parcels have been distributed among the forest users not by the results of competitions
but by direct negotiations, thus turning out to be the object of bargaining between forest
users and the krai administration” (Antonova and Mabel, 1998, p. 6). The
Commission’s broad authority superseded the traditional role of the Federal Forest
Service to allocate forest lands, subordinating the provincial branch of the Forest
Service to the authority of the Governor and the Commission. At the municipal level,
the Commission took advantage of the loopholes in the 1993 Fundamentals and
appropriated raion authority to issue licenses for long term lease, allocate large scale
forest lots for exploitation, and negotiate payment rates for the long term use of forest
resources. Criticizing the raiony for “misuse and causing unreasonable delay in
compiling and preparing documents”, the relocation of control from the raion to the krai
promised “a more orderly allocation of forest tracts for rent” (Bardal, 1998, p. 16).
But improved administrative efficiency was not the only reason behind the krai’s
interest in direct control over the territorial forest resources. By 1994, there was
growing international interest in Khabarovsk timber for export to Pacific Rim markets.
Of industrial roundwood produced in the krai, 84 percent was exported to international
markets, and forest products accounted for $218 million in trade; more than 50 percent
of the krai’s trade by value (Sheingauz et al., 1996, pp. 38–40). Within three years, the
Russian Far East — of which Khabarovsk is the largest timber producer — would be
earning 57.2 percent of Russia’s foreign exchange earning from timber exports
(Kozlova et al., 1999, p. 108). Further, in 1994 there were 35 Russian-foreign joint
ventures in the production and processing of industrial roundwood and furniture for
export, half of their authorized capital from foreign sources (Gataulina and Waggener,
1997, p. 54). Along with foreign direct investment, the krai administration anticipated
new technology, western management skills, expanded employment opportunities, and
better market rates for timber sold on the international market. That the krai
aggressively established control over the lucrative forest resources, and not other raw
material resources in the province, was no surprise to the chief of one of Khabarovsk’s
largest non-governmental environmental organizations:
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“The (krai) administration tries to influence the administration of forest
activities via the Commission and licensing. The license is from the
Department of Natural Resources and Management of Extractive Industry,
not from the Forest Service. In contrast, hunting licenses are from the krai
branch of the Federal Office of Environmental Protection. The krai officials
saw that timber means money so they wanted to control that. But hunting
doesn’t bring in the same kind of revenues so the officials were willing to
grant discretion to the krai branch of the federal department on that” (Chief
of Environmental NGO, 1998).
3.2.4 Department of Natural Resources and
Extractive Industries Management
Another initiative by the krai was the creation of the Department of Natural Resources
and Extractive Industries Management. Under the Soviet system, the krai administration
had no provincial policy-making body to lend direction and management focus to the
forestry complex; forest policy and management were decreed from Moscow and the
krai’s participation was largely a formality (Sheingauz, 1998c). Seeking to establish its
own administrative capacity and authority in the forest industrial sector, in 1990 the krai
administration created the Division of Natural Resources and Extractive Industries
Management (later upgraded to a Department). Broadly speaking, the Department
regulates the organization of the forest industrial sector, writes policy governing natural
resource use, and houses the licensing department that carries out the decisions of the
krai Commission on Forest Use (Efremov et al., 1999, p. 6). In this, the administration
established its own platform from which to develop policy on natural resource use and
to lend longer term direction and strategic development focus to the industry. It also
created an administrative liaison for companies and countries seeking to set up
operations or forest industrial relations in the krai.
In 1997, the krai administration also established a Directorate of Forestry and Wood
Processing Industries (reorganized in early 1999 as a Division of Forest Industry) within
the Department. The new Directorate was charged with supervising the forest industrial
sector and implementing krai policy in the sphere of wood harvesting and processing,
develop industrial potential of the krai forest sector, and develop proposals on regional
strategy for forest industrial development. As with the creation of the Commission on
Forest Use, the creation of the Department and its Directorate altered the flows of state
authority in the administration of the forestry sector, filling the policy, strategy, and
management niche once dictated from Moscow and implemented by the krai branch of
the Forest Service. The krai Forest Service was now subordinated not only to the higher
authority of its own federal offices in Moscow and to the krai Commission on Forest
Use, but it now also had to coordinate all its major resolutions — including the
assignment of forest tracts to the forest users — with this new krai Department
(Antonova and Mabel, 1998, p. 6).
3.2.5 Krai Certification Commission
A fourth initiative by the krai administration also had its origin in the early days of
regional independence. At the end of the 1980s, there were 32 state forest industrial
enterprises in Khabarovsk Krai and by 1998, the enterprise sector had grown to over
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400 independent or semi-state forest industrial enterprises (Sheingauz et al., 1996, p. 18;
Pilipienko, 1999, p. 86). Long before this rush of private enterprise, however, the krai
administration adopted its 1992 Regulations on Qualification Certification of Forest
Users in Khabarovsk Krai (Sekhin, 1997, p. 1), making Khabarovsk the first province in
the Russian Federation to require certification of forest users as a prerequisite to
receiving lease rights. Krai certification was conducted under the supervision of the
provincial Forest Service, by a commission of representatives from various krai
agencies, the Forest Service, and representatives from the timber industry (Sekhin and
Vachaeva, 1998, p. 1). The three-year certification aimed to verify enterprises’ technical
capacity to comply with forest use regulations, and cleared the way for a license to
harvest more than 5000 cubic meters of timber per year.  In 1999, supervision of the
certification process was moved from the purview of the Forest Service to the krai’s
Department of Natural Resources and Extractive Industries. User certification decisions
at the municipal level are now similarly determined by raion administrations.
Certification was among the krai’s earliest efforts to assert regional control over the
increasingly open access to forest resources, and this latest relocation of the
Certification Commission removed another layer of discretion from the Federal Forest
Service’s authority to determine who may or may not work in the woods.
3.2.6 1995 Krai Legislation On Leasing and
Payments for Forest Fund Use
The counterpart to the krai’s multiple initiatives to appropriate control over forest
access is a fifth initiative, this one to control the revenues generated by their use. In June
1996, Governor Ishaev signed into law, On Principles of Determining Forest Duties
and Lease Payment Rates for Use of Timber Resources in Khabarovsk Krai. In doing
so, the krai established a fixed schedule of minimum stumpage fees and revenue
distribution, and introduced a rent surcharge for the long-term guarantee of forest use.
(Payment terms and concessions granted to forest users are listed in Appendix, Box
A3.)
Among the legislation’s principle departures from the Fundamentals was the redirection
of revenue flows: instead of all forest use revenues going to the raiony, now a share of
dues and lease payments were reserved for the krai (Sekhin, 1997, p. 5). Under the 1995
Principles, 25 percent of revenues from forest dues and lease payments goes to the krai
non-budget fund for reforestation and protection and to support those leskhoz in greatest
financial need.7 Another 25 percent goes to the raion non-budget fund for reforestation
                                                
7
 Non-budget funds, or “off-budget” revenue, are funds in the public sector that are not subject to central
budgetary control. They were established in Khabarovsk at the provincial and municipal levels to
guarantee financing of forest management activities, namely fire prevention and reforestation, and to
balance the disparity in revenues from forest use among the 44 leskhozy in the krai. (Mikheeva, 1999, p.
9). The non-budget funds were officially discontinued by the federal government in 1995, but the krai and
raion administrations maintained their funds, which are now comprised of revenues from forest use,
penalties and fees for forest damage or violation of management rules, and “voluntary contributions” as
dictated by the leskhoz, the municipal office of environmental protection, or the raion administrators
(Sekhin, 1997, pp. 5–6). The funds are meant to support reforestation and fire protection, but at the raion
level, they increasingly go to help municipal administrations meet the needs of the local timber
enterprises, infrastructure, and the workers living in forest villages in the district (Sekhin, 1997, p. 6).
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and forest protection or for district needs. The remaining 50 percent goes to the raion’s
general budget (Mikheeva, 1999, p. 5; Sekhin, 1997, p. 5).
The 1995 Principles also established new user fees associated with the competitive
allocation of long term leases. A guarantee deposit for the lease payment goes to the
Krai State Property Fund, and a negotiable one-time starting payment goes to cover the
organization and implementation costs of the competition (Mikheeva, 1999, p. 5;
Sekhin, 1997, p. 3). The distribution of the one-time payment is mandated as follows:
Distribution of one-time starting payment
Table 2 shows the distribution of the one-time starting payments for lots put up for
competition in 1996 and 1997 (this table corresponds with the information presented in
Table 1). The payments increased from 350 million rubles in 1996 to 1.75 billion rubles
in 1997, as the number of lots put up for competition increased from 11 to 60,
respectively.
Table 2. Distribution of One-Time Starting Payments for Forest Fund Lots Allocated by
Competition
Recipient 1996 1997
One-time starting payments received (million rubles) 349 1,755
Including:
   Property Fund
   — for conducting the lease competition
   — 5% of the balance for insurance fund
47.8 (13.7%)
15.2 (4.3%)
221.13 (12.6%)
84.42 (4.8%)
   Leskhoz — 50% of the balance 150.3 (43.1%) 747.98 (42.62%)
   Raion Budget — 45% of the balance 135.7 (38.9%) 701.6 (39.98%)
Total 349 (100%) 1,755 (100%)
Source: Department of Natural Resources and Resource Extraction Industry, Khabarovskii Krai
Administration, 1998; Mikheeva (1999); Bardal (1998).
An amount to cover the cost of
bringing the forest site up for
lease; plus an additional 5% of
the balance above cost to create
an insurance fund to compensate
for unforeseen expenses (law
suits, additional environmental
assessment, etc.). Both are
transferred to the Krai State
Property Fund.
50% of the balance
above cost goes to
the leskhoz, as the
proprietor of the
section of the
forest lands that is
given over for
exploitation.
45% of the balance
above cost goes to
the raion in whose
territory the leased
forest site is
located.
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By 1997, then, the majority of direct financial and administrative control over the forest
fund resources was located with the offices of the krai administration. The krai had thus
far granted itself the legislative authority to allocate the large scale and long term lease
of the forest resources, to rule on who could harvest and where, legislated new incomes
from resource use for the krai budget, and largely centralized control of the revenues
from forest use in the province. But the federal government was not about to let the
expansion of extensive provincial controls over a vast regional raw material resource go
without comment. In adopting the 1997 Federal Forest Code, the federal government
served the krai administration notice, granting the provincial centralizing efforts a
compromising boost in return for a federal share of the returns from exploitation of the
territorial forest resources.
3.2.7 1997 Federal Forest Code
The 1997 federal forest legislation, the Forest Code of the Russian Federation, was
adopted by the State Duma of the Russian Federation on January 22, 1997, replacing the
1993 Fundamentals as the ranking federal legislation governing Russian forests. In
many ways, the 1997 Code marked a further departure from Soviet-era forest
legislation, with its continued decentralization of authority, support for market
mechanisms, and explicit reference to the ecological and resource potential of the forest
fund, but it did not go so far as to take the federal government entirely out of the mix.
Instead, the federal government reinserted itself back into regional governance of forest
use in four important areas: setting the minimum use fees for standing timber and non-
timber forest products; taking a cut of revenues from payments for forest use; restricting
concession agreements to partnership with the federal government; and declaring the
forests to be federally-owned public property. That said, the 1997 Code also sanctioned
much of the jurisdiction the krai had already granted itself between 1994 and 1997. Box
A4 in the Appendix presents federal and provincial governments’ respective authority
“in the sphere of use, control and protection of the forest fund and forest reproduction”,
based on Articles 46 and 47 of the 1997 Forest Code.
Forest allocation.  The new Code relocates allocation authority, for the most part, from
the municipal to the provincial authorities. Short term use of forest land can be allocated
by the provincial government or by auctions organized by municipal governments and
the leskhoz. Long term leases are awarded by decision of the krai administration or by
competitive forest tenders, in both cases in accordance with the krai Forest Service and
input from municipal governments (Articles 34 and 35). The new Code also introduced
forest concessions, which are to be agreed between the federal government and the
forest user (Article 38). Concessions grant access to undeveloped forest land for up to
49 years with the understanding that the user will construct and maintain roads and
other infrastructure in the concession area, grant some agreed share of the developed
products or services to the federal government, and abide by “terms and conditions
defined… at the parties’ discretion” (Articles 40–41) (World Bank, 1996, p. 172). For
the various types of long and short term tenure, the forest user still needs the annual
permits from the leskhoz to make any actual use of the forest resources (Article 42).
Payments system.  Minimum stumpage fees are now set by the federal government for
all types of forest use.  Dues for short term use are still based on a per unit or per
hectare basis (Article 103), with anything above the minimum set by the provincial
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government or by forest auctions as mentioned above. Long term lease payments are
still defined by negotiated or competitive lease terms, with competitive lease rates based
on the minimum stumpage fee rate and the annual allowable cut (AAC) of the leased
parcel (Mikheeva, 1999, p. 4). Failing a competition, lease fees are to be set in direct
negotiations, leaving a “large free hand” to the negotiators. Efremov et al. (1999, p. 34)
echo the concerns of krai economists when they write: “Though the Code preferences
competitions, it doesn’t stipulate when and under what conditions negotiation could be
used, leaving a loophole for arbitrariness and bureaucratic corruption where bureaucrats
might decide themselves what form of assignment to use and when”.
Revenue distribution.  The 1997 Forest Code once again redirected the flow of forest
use revenues, as the federal government introduced an entirely new mechanism for
financing forest administration and management. In territories with an annual allowable
cut of more than one million hectares, 40 percent of the revenues from minimum
stumpage fees now goes to the general federal budget (not the Forest Service budget),
and 60 percent goes to the budget of the provincial subject, earmarked in large part for
reforestation activities. Any stumpage revenues above the federal minimum rate go
directly to the leskhoz to finance forest management and are tax exempt as budgetary
funds (Article 106) (HIID et al., 1998, pp. 7–8; World Bank, 1996, p. 173; Efremov et
al., 1999, p. 34; Mikheeva, 1999, p. 9).8 Thus, the 1997 Code took the raiony out of the
flow of revenues entirely, rerouting all minimum fee revenues to the federal and krai
government budgets (World Bank, 1996, p. 173).
Leskhoz reform.  In addition, the 1997 Code redefined the responsibilities of the
leskhoz, the district level forest management units. Identifying the leskhoz as the state
regulator of forest management, the Code emphasized the “incompatibility of
commercial logging and timber processing with the regulatory functions of the state
over the use, conservation, protection and regeneration of forest” (Article 50). Thus, the
Code legislated an end to the commercial activities that had long supplemented the
leskhoz budget. Being banned from engaging in industrial activities, “the leskhoz main
activities (were limited to) silvicultural and forest protection measures and the
introduction of market-driven features — such as auctions and leasing arrangements —
into forestry” (Kopylova, 1999, p. 335).
Though the 1997 Forest Code rearranged important administrative functions and
financial benefits to the advantage of the federal state, the new legislation essentially
codified the controls that the krai administration had legislated for itself between 1993
and 1997, delegating direct control of the forest fund, if not ownership, to the subjects
of the Russian Federation. In anticipation of the new Code, the World Bank (1996, p.
171) wrote that “the competence of subnational governments has been so broadened as
to cancel almost all the legal rights of municipalities in forest legal relations in the
process”. And by banning the leskhoz from engaging in industrial forestry activities, in
the expectation that competitive forest auctions would push stumpage fees above the
federal minimums, the Code dramatically curtailed government financing for forestry
administration and management. The leskhoz were made dependent not only on the
economic health of forest enterprises and their timely remittance of payments for forest
use, but also on the depleted federal and krai budgetary resources in times of scarcity.
                                                
8
 In territories where there is less than one million hectares AAC, 100 percent of the minimum fees paid
go to the provincial budget.
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There are two other important initiatives adopted by the krai administration to
supplement the already substantial legislation in its favor. First, in December 1998, the
Khabarovsk Krai Duma passed the Khabarovsk Krai Forest Law, after six years of
debate and revision. And second, in 1998, the krai administration started a movement to
renationalize forest industrial enterprises and production within the krai.
3.2.8 1998 Krai Forest Law9
The Khabarovsk Forest Law, as adopted, is largely a response to the 1997 Federal
Forest Code, elaborating where the federal code lacks specificity and affirming the
krai’s independent authority to govern rights of use and exploitation of the forests.  It is
more environmentally oriented than the 1997 Federal Code, with attention to protection
of the forest ecological systems and sustainable use of the resources as well as
specifications for the development of environmental assessments. This was largely in
response to the sense by officials and practitioners in the krai that federal legislation had
led to overexploitation of the forest resource and that to amend this history, the krai
needed to write its own forestry law.
The krai Law describes the powers of the krai and raiony, affirming the legitimacy of
the Krai Commission on Forest Use, and proposing to assign forest rights entirely
through open auctions and closed competitions. Though the law declares all forest users
equal, it maintains the privileged, noncompetitive access for forest users who have
worked in the area “for a long time”; the Governor can grant 1 to 5 year leases to these
enterprises with the capacity to harvest and process the forest resources, and 1 to 10
year leases for those who harvest with environmentally sound technologies (Article 43).
All users must still be certified before they can be granted a license to lease, and though
the 1997 Forest Code reserved concession agreements with the federal government
exclusively, the krai law proposed to allow concession agreements with the krai
administration.
The minimum rates of forest dues and rental fees are still set by the krai legislature
(based on the federally-set minimum stumpage fees), and as with the allocation of forest
tracts, use payments are to be determined by competitive bidding rather than fixed price
lists, as in the past. Payment rates are to be indexed to economic indicators so as to
accommodate changes in the economic climate, and payments (and rates) are separated
for the volume of harvested wood and the leased land area. And where the 1997 Federal
Code denied raiony any income from forest dues and lease payments, the krai law
grants the municipalities half of the krai’s 60 percent share of these revenues.
3.2.9 Forest Enterprise Debt Restructuring
In 1998, the krai administration moved to extend its direct control into the forest
industrial sector. After the boom of new forest enterprises following the central
government’s early privatization and trade liberalization policies, many enterprises
found they were unable to meet their lease, tax and other financial payments to the krai
and raion budgets. While raion administrations were able to accept payment in kind,
taxes and payments to the krai had to be in cash, and by the middle of 1998, the debt of
                                                
9
 The discussion of the 1998 krai Forest Law draws heavily from Efremov et al. (1999), pp. 35–40.
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forest users to the krai was 100 billion rubles (Antonova and Mabel, 1998, p. 9). In
1998, Khabarovsk introduced a program of debt restructuring to absolve enterprise debt
in return for a controlling interest in the company. Vertical integration by the krai,
reasoned some officials, “would allow for subsequent control of the technological
processes of harvesting, processing and transportation, and also enable tax relief at
every stage of production and thereby also a reduction of production costs” (Efremov et
al., 1999, pp. 21–22).
To this end, the krai created Khabarovskglavles (Khabarovsk State Forestry
Corporation) which is “in charge of all matters regarding the forest product industry”
(Russia and FSU Monitor, 1999, p. 5). Khabglavles was given “a mandate to organize
and rationalize timber harvesting and processing operations within the krai, with the
objective to increase the level of taxes paid to the krai, rationalize and increase
production in the harvesting sector, and promote manufacturing and exports by reducing
the number of traders and brokers in the export business” (Wood Resources
International Ltd. and CARANA Corporation, 1999, p. 32). The krai State Property
Committee “bought out” two of the most important state holding companies in the krai
— Dal’lesprom, which was the majority shareholder in more than 30 harvesting
ventures, 14 timber processing enterprises, and the largest port operation in the krai, and
Dal’les, the marketing agent for Dal’lesprom — and essentially replaced them in early
1999 with Khabarovskglavles (Wood Resources International Ltd. and CARANA
Corporation, 1999, p. 32). Operating on a stated policy of increasing secondary timber
processing, as of June 1999 there was a policy in the works that would require logging
enterprises to sell 20 percent of their production volume to Khabarovskglavles, which
would then send it on to domestic mills for processing.  It was not clear whether this
policy would survive the challenges made to it by the independent harvest and export
enterprises operating in the territory, though it is, regardless, an explicit effort to bring
the industrial operations under greater control of the administration and a return to a
centralized krai monopoly in the provincial forest industry.
3.3 Centralization of Provincial State Control
over the Forest Resources
“Currently, the prominent feature of Russian social life is the struggle for
the redistribution of rights. It occurs along vertical and horizontal axes on all
the authority levels and in all spheres. Specifically, it is noticeable on the
krai level, which, from one side tries to expand its rights at the expense of
the federal center, and from another (side), at the expense of the raion”
(Efremov et al., 1999).
Over the course of six years from 1992 to 1998, the Khabarovsk administration took
President Yeltsin’s call for regional sovereignty to heart and legislated its direct
authority over the forest wealth in the krai. A review of the broad relocation of codified
authority governing the forest resources shows that jurisdiction which was centered in
Moscow prior to 1991, moved to the municipalities after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, and then to the provincial level beginning in 1994 where it remains, save some
concessions to the federal government. Even with the recentralizing measures of the
1997 Federal Forest Code (federal ownership, minimum stumpage fees, mandated
revenue distribution, and limiting concessions to federal partnership), the krai
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administration maintained its controlling authority in the provincial forest sector, with
federal sanction to develop forest industry policy and strategy, establish the payments
system above the federal minimum, certify users, allocate land, negotiate lease terms,
and collect 60 percent of the stumpage fees and other revenues from forest use. Figure 1
illustrates the organizational structure of forest management in Khabarovsk. Figure 2
illustrates the location of direct control over forest fund use in the krai as of the end of
1998. Table 3 gives a sense of the legislated relocation of authority from the municipal
to the krai. Table 4 illustrates the financial flows of fees and changes levied on forest
users for access to the forest resources.
Driving the provincial centralization of control over Khabarovsk’s forests was the
administration’s growing expectations of economic returns to industrial development of
the timber resources for export. In 1993, government statistics indicated that there were
30 hectares of forest per capita in Khabarovsk, which some administrative officials
characterized as “an excess of forest” from which the krai could profit “by letting
residents of other regions of the world use the local forest resources” (Efremov et al.,
1996, p. 22). Five years later, the Khabarovsk administration, in collaboration with
USAID, again identified the forest resources as “one of the most critical components of
the economy”, and suggested that “…the forest resources make (the region) a traditional
forest raw material supplier for Russia and the rapidly growing North East Asian
countries” (USAID EPT/RFE, 1998, p. 3). Russian and Canadian industry analysts
estimate that regional output of commercial harvest in the Russian Far East amounts to
7 million cubic meters with exports of 5 million cubic meters, with expectations that
within 25 years, these regional volumes could rise to as much as 23 million cubic meters
of harvest and 19 million cubic meters of exports (Backman and Zausaev, 1998, p. i).
Given that the neighboring Pacific Rim countries — Japan, China, and South Korea, in
particular — imported $840 million worth of forest products from the region in 1997,
and their demand for forest products is expected to increase, Khabarovsk, as the RFE’s
largest producer of forest products, stands to be “one of the major players of the Pacific
Rim in the decade ahead” (USAID EPT/RFE, 1998, p. 24; Wood Resources
International Ltd. and CARANA Corporation, 1999, p. 5).
This changing location — and logic — of control over the forest resources posed a
direct challenge to the previously existing governance authority and interests of the
Forest Service and the municipal administrators.  With the krai’s self-appointed
authority over the forest resources and the passage of the 1997 federal forest code, the
krai branch of the Forest Service was made subordinate to the krai administration on
final decisions granting forest resources into use. The raiony lost the basis for their
financial and administrative autonomy, the receipt of forestry revenues reduced and now
predicated on timely and complete payment by forest users into the non-budget funds.
And district-level Forest Service agents, the leskhoz, became dependent, in part, on the
krai and raion administrations’ non-budget funds for financial support for forest
management, based on the dubious expectation that once having received the fees into
their accounts, the krai and raiony would transfer the increasingly scarce funds to the
leskhoz.
These changes have not been met without a struggle. The incompatibility of multiple
state interests has led to competition and infighting between the krai administration and
those local state institutions governing the forest resources in the territory. Despite six
years of sweeping legislative reforms that ended local control over forest use and re-
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routed essential revenues to krai and federal budgets, the raion and leskhoz have
persisted in their prior practical authority. Sanctioned or otherwise, they have continued
to allocate forest lands, set the terms of use, and direct the revenues from forest users. In
contrast, the krai branch of the Federal Forest Service does not seem to have the
political-economic room to maneuver to adapt to the challenges to its authority,
sandwiched between the strict vertical hierarchy of the Federal Forest Service and the
new expanding horizontal authority of the reformed Khabarovsk administration. The
next section looks at these tensions created by the provincial and federal states’
appropriation of powers from the raion and leskhoz, and the morphing of local state
authority to hold onto or expand control of the forest wealth within their territory.
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Figure 1.  Organizational Structure of Forest Resource Management in Khabarovsk Krai, as of December 1998
Sources: Based on Efremov et al. (1999) and Sheingauz (1998a,b,c).
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Table 3. Evolution of Codified State Authority and Revenues Governing the Control of Forest Fund Resources in Khabarovsk Krai
Codified
authority
Federal
Krai
(provincial)
Raion
(municipal)
Leshhoz
Pre-1992
Determines harvest,
payments, distribution of
revenues in plan
Allocates lots, in
collaboration w/leskhoz;
Determines concrete forest
use payments
Receives forest use
revenue directly;
discretion to share with
leskhoz
Financial support from
federal budget, own funds
Allocates annual permits
1993
1993 Fundamentals
Issues license and allocates
lots, in collaboration with
leskhoz
Determines payment in
negotiations with forest
users, with leskhoz
Receives forest use
revenue directly, with
discretion to share with
leskhoz; receives
forest dues and lease
payments; cash or in-kind
payment
Support from federal
budget, own funds
Allocates annual permits
1994
Krai Commission on FU
long term use: issues
license, negotiates lease
terms or via competition,
allocates lots w/KFFS
KCFU negotiates lease
payments or set in
competition
short term use: raion
allocates lots or via auction
with leskhoz
1995
Krai Principles on Leasing
long term use: issues
license, negotiates lease
terms or via competition;
allocates lots w/KFFS;
sets minimum stumpage;
KCFU negotiates lease
payments or set in
competition;  Guarantee
deposit; One-time starting
fee.
dues and lease fees:
25% to krai NBF
Guarantee deposit to
KCSP
One-time starting fee:
cover costs to KCSP
5% balance to KCSP;
short term use: allocates
lots or w/leskhoz auction
Short-term fees
determined by raion
negotiation or leskhoz
auction
dues and lease fees:
75% to raion
one-time starting fee:
45% balance above costs
short term use: auctions;
annual permits
one-time starting fee:
50% balance to leskhoz
1997
1997 Federal Forest Code
sets minimum stumpage
fees;  federal ownership of
forests;  concession
agreements; 40% of dues
and lease fees
short term use: may
allocate lots in collaborat.
w/KFFS
long term use: issues
license, organizes
competitive or negotiated
lease terms, allocates lots
in collaboration w/KFFS
sets differential rates for
stumpage above fed. min.;
or prices set by bidding.
dues and lease fees:
   60% to krai
short term use: allocates
lots in collaboration
w/leskhoz
dues and lease fees:
0% to raion
short term use: quarterly
auctions, annual permits
dues and lease fees:
balance above min.
stumpage fee
1998
1998 Krai Forest Law
dues and lease fees:
40% to federal budget
dues and lease fees:
40% to krai NBF
dues and lease fees:
20% to raion NBF
KFFS: Krai branch of the Federal Forest Service; KCFU: Krai Commission on Forest Use; KCSP: Krai Committee on State Property; NBF: non-budget funds.
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Figure 2. Direct Regulation of Forest Use in Khabarovsk Krai, as of December 1998
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Table 4. Financial Flows of Forest Use Fees, as of the close of 1998
Tax/Revenue
Base Fee or Tax Form
Method of
Determination
Method of
Charging Paid to Whom?
Use rights
Use Charges
Short term
use, up to 1
year:
Additional
charges for
long term
use, for
1–49 years:
If lease
competition:
License fee
Stumpage fee for
extracted resources
(standing timber,
secondary use, non-
timber forest
products)
Land rent
Auction
participation fee
Lease Payment
(includes land rent)
Guarantee deposit
One-time starting
payment
Based on stock
volume of leased
area
minimum stumpage
fee set by
Rosleskhoz1, based
on species, distance
to transport, etc.;
Krai sets differen-
tial rates; leskhoz
and raion can raise
above minimum by
auction or
negotiation.
5% of stumpage
costs + 5% +/-
fixed annual
payment for leased
territory; based on
AAC of leased
parcel; determined
by negotiation or
competition
determined by krai
Committee on State
Property
negotiated with
Competition
Commission (one
time body); not less
than assessed value
plus sales expenses
Paid once
Paid annually, for
short term use
before get annual
timber ticket; paid
through banks, but
may be in cash,
kind, or in services
to raion
Paid annually
Paid at auction
As negotiated in
lease terms
Paid once
Paid once
To krai Committee
of State Property2
40% of minimum
to federal budget;
60% of minimum
to krai, which may
send 20% to raion;
above minimum to
leskhoz, tax exempt
as non-budget
funds for
management only
To raion budget
To krai Committee
of State Property
Same distribution
as for stumpage
fees
To krai Committee
of State Property
Costs of
competition and
5% of balance
above cost to
KCSP2; 45% of
balance to raion;
50% of balance to
leskhoz
1 Rosleskhoz: Russian Federal Forest Service.
2
 Krai Committee on State Property (KCSP) is a division of the Khabarosvk Krai Administration.
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4. The Logic of Infighting:
Tensions Created at the Local Level
“This strong knot of contradictions bound up with the redistribution of
powers and rights is undoubtedly provoked to some extent by (an) arrogance
of authority of some organs and individuals. However, the real state of
affairs is the struggle for managing finanical flows, including budgetary
ones. This (financial) management provides real power and to a definite
extent allows personal enrichment”  (Efremov et al., 1999).
“In former times, all revenues from the forest user went to the raion. Now,
not a penny” (Sheingauz, 1998a).
4.1 The Apparent Order
In her chapter on state autonomy in local China, Hsing (1998, p. 109) writes that “the
central theme of the central-local relationship, be it a socialist or non-socialist country,
is fiscal politics: how the revenue shall be shared and the expenditure split”.
Accordingly, in Khabarovsk, the struggle between the krai and the raiony is essentially
over who controls the benefits from territorial forest use, and for the raiony, a key
source of economic independence and financial self-management. In addition to losing
the obvious benefits of direct payment for forest use, the raiony are also fighting to
maintain their position as arbiter of resource allocation and pricing, and with it,
opportunties to negotiate and bargain for additional incomes — in cash, in kind, in
infrastructure investment — in exchange for access.  Similarly, by banning the leskhoz
from engaging in industrial activities, federal reforms deprived the district forest
management bodies of a main source of independent income. In response, these local
state bodies have adapted their institutional powers to hold onto their financial and
administrative autonomy. The politicial-economic relationships of power that now
pertain in the Khabarovsk forestry sector are not necessarily those codified by the
provincial and federal leglislative reforms, but are more often localized, relative
relationships of power held by the local state authorities and practiced at the local level,
as they continue to govern access and control over the forest resources in their
immediate purview.  At my questions about this recognized informal authority in the
face of legislated reforms, my mentor at the Economic Research Institute in Khabarovsk
shrugged his shoulders and remarked, “Yavochni par'yadok,” literally, the apparent
order, explaining that the current system bypasses the formal order and has been
accepted as a matter of practical reality. The next section looks first at the practical
implications of the formal order for local state autonomy and then at the informal
extension of authority by the raion administrators and the leskhoz to get around it.
4.2 Raiony: “There is a new crisis every day...
We now have less than we had before”
According to Natalya Shulyakovskaya (2000), writing for the St. Petersburg Times,
timber is “the blood trickling through the soggy veins” of the small and failing timber
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towns in the Russian Far East: “Without timber, there would be nothing to pump life
into the endless cycle of barter deals that make it possible for (towns) to survive.
Because of timber, bread is still baked here, kindergartens are still heated, new houses
go up and sparkling four-wheel-drives roar along the wide bumpy roads of town”. But,
as explained above, local control over the local forests came to an official end in
Khabarovsk when the krai legislation combined with the 1997 Forest Code to “cancel
almost all the rights which raiony had in forest legal relations” (Efremov et al., 1999).
The municipal non-budget funds were cancelled and raion authorities were entrusted
only with collecting forest dues, none of which were reserved for their budgets.
Administrators lost their traditional jurisdiction over large scale and long term
allocation of forest resources, and now had to collaborate with the leskhoz on the
allocation of short term, small scale lots (Sheingauz, 1998c). Forest users were directed
to pay directly to the krai account and the krai was to disburse it accordingly
(Sheingauz, 1998c).
The reduction of municipal authority was criticized by some officals in the krai Forest
Service as unjustified, and the Chief of the State Forest Research Institute in
Khabarovsk added, “The raiony have been vested with great authority for allocation of
forest resources for use… Their role in forest use management on their territory is really
great and it is not possible to ignore their opinion” (Efremov, 1998, p. 103).
Actually, the krai administration suggests, it is possible to ignore the raions’ opinion,
and argues that it is the krai’s prerogative to establish the degree of raion
administrations’ involvement in forest management, use, collection of fees, and
corresponding regulations. According to the director of licensing:
“…with the Federal Code, the raiony were deprived of all of their
responsibilities and rights, but they’ve preserved the scheme of their work.
The raiony cannot make big decisions; for instance, they can only send their
proposals for forest use to the Krai. They can no longer make those
decisions independently… Oftentimes the opinion of the raion is not taken
into consideration by the Krai. It’s not a matter of disrespect, but rather one
where the Krai sees problems at a different level.  Because unfortunately our
responsibilities and interests are different” (Director of Licensing
Department, 1998b).
Concurrent with this loss of fiscal and administrative independence in the sphere of
forestry, municipal administrations found themselves facing an expanded fiscal-
administrative mandate to support social, economic, and infrastructure investments once
paid by locally-based harvesting enterprises.  In Soviet times, when a state forest
industrial enterprise, a leskpromhoz (LPX), arrived in a place to harvest, if there was no
community or settlement there, the state enterprise was funded largely by Moscow to
meet all the logistics for the creation of a working community in the woods. Once
established, the LPX became an integral part of the social-economic community.  If a
forest enterprise came into a pre-existing community, the raion administration would try
to get its directors to take on responsibility and funding for various aspects of social
infrastructure. State forest enterprises built roads, cut fuelwood for community heating
needs, built housing for workers, and provided transportation, among other social
services. Revenues from their forest use paid for local education and public health
services. The Chief of Natural Resource and Infrastructure Problems at the Economic
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Research Institute told me, “The plans used to indicate the local social needs and how
much fuelwood was required. Often when a new LPX was created, the local
administrations would try to get them to improve their water supplies, their roads,
basically to take on social expenditures”. The companies did not always have much
choice in the matter. Anatoly Shvidenko, at the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis, explained: “If the head of the hospital ran out of wood, he would call
the director of the LPX, say I need a thousand cubic meters of wood, and the director
would have it sent over and write it off as a loss from the harvesting volumes. Because
if he didn't (send the wood over), he would lose his post as the head of the LPX.”
With the early post-Soviet reforms to privatize state industrial enterprises, many of the
LPX were privatized and forced to operate without the Soviet-era subsidies that covered
everything from production to transport to sales. As part of this movement to “market
efficiency”, the enterprises were relieved of their responsibilities to meet the social,
economic, and infrastructural needs of the districts, leaving the raion governments with
the fiscal burden.
This loss of state subsidized infrastructure investment, coupled with the loss of local
fiscal and administrative authority to the krai, created a crisis for the municipal
governments, especially in the regions of the krai where the forest industry is the central
economic activity. An administrator from Periyaslavka Raion described their present
straits:
“If we speak of the 1990 plan — we maintained the roads, schools,
hospitals, all according to the plan. And then, when the LPX started
collapsing, they couldn’t provide the necessary support. …With the arrival
of perestroika, it was impossible for the LPX to support all social structures
in the municipality. …Now we face poverty because the roads and buildings
are not being maintained. All structures have come to nothing… There is a
new crisis every day. We now have less than we had before”
(Administrator, 1999).
In addition to the unfunded mandates, many forest enterprises fail to pay their dues and
lease payments and are in considerable debt to the krai and raiony.  In 1997, only 46
percent of payments owed for forest resource use were received by the krai non-budget
fund, and the average share of payments received into the raion budget and non-budget
funds was 57 percent and 53 percent, respectively. Table 5 illustrates that, in 1997, eight
of 14 raiony reporting in the krai received less than 50 percent of the forest payments
due to their general budget fund, and only one raion had received full payment.
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Table 5. Forest Payments in Khabarovsk Krai, 1997
Estimated Payments Due, million rubles Receipts, %
Raion Raion
Budget
Raion
NBFund
Krai
NBFund
Total Raion
Budget
Raion
NBFund
Krai
NBFund
Total
Ayano-Maiskii 129.0 64.4 66.4 259.8 33.9 33.9 8.8 27.5
Nikolaevskii 1197.7 495.8 584.5 2278 0 47.1 92.5 34.0
Ul’chskii 4704.1 2385.0 2262.7 9351.8 82.1 49.6 31.5 61.6
Imeno P. Osipenko 1086.5 537.2 534.8 2158.5 105.8 88.2 30.1 82.7
Verkhne-Bureinskii 2042.4 1032.5 914.4 3989.3 47.7 68.8 79.8 60.5
Solnechnyi 6129.5 3357.0 3202.3 12688.8 82.4 70.3 54.6 72.2
Komsomol’skii 3060.0 1688.3 1636.0 6384.3 31.3 57.4 74 49.2
Vaninskii 5612.5 2821.7 2822.3 11256.5 59.4 59.1 60.7 59.7
Sovetsko-Gavan’skii 2460.1 1230.7 1214.2 4905.0 12.5 10.7 14 12.4
Amurskii 56.5 28.2 28.2 112.9 9.4 295.7 9.6 81.0
Nanaiskii 1351.2 677.8 652.5 2681.5 41.7 37.3 20.4 35.4
Khabarovskii 840.2 420.4 420.2 1680.8 32.2 35.9 47.9 37.1
Imeni Lazo 4990.0 2487.0 2504.0 9981.0 52.1 33.1 17.7 38.7
Vyazemskii 292.2 142.7 136.2 571.1 72.6 64.7 38.7 62.5
   Total for Krai 33951.9 17368.7 16978.7 68299.3 56.9 52.7 46.1 53.2
Note: Only 14 of 17 raiony in Khabarovsk Krai are represented here.
Source: Department of Forests, Khabarovskii Krai, 1998, in Mikheeva (1999), p. 7.
4.2.1 “Plan is Plan. Fact is Fact”
So said the administrator from Periyaslavka by way of explaination that, depite the far-
reaching reforms from above, by 1998, krai control over the forest resources existed
more on paper than in practice. The raion administrations have essentially ignored what
they could and accommodated what they must. Many raion officials have expanded
their income base, maintained a share of the revenues generated by forest use, and
continue to allocate forest lands for harvest in the municipality. The Chief of Licensing,
despite her consistent advocacy for expanded krai authority, explained one reason for
the raions’ persisting governing authority:
“The 1997 Forest Code gives the krai authority to distribute the functions
between the krai and the raion authorities. But the old system (1995) is now
in use, and when the new system (1997) is introduced in the future there will
be some conflicts. One reason for this is the Law of Self-Government,
which grants many rights to the local authorities.10 It’s out there. No one is
                                                
10
 The Law of Self-Government, adopted by the federal government in August 1991, refers to the local
self-governing bodies, elected or otherwise designated by the local population, and grants these bodies the
authority to decide issues of local importance (Article 1, 2). They do not constitute a part of state power
and are separate from the raion administration as the municipal state executive authority. Only a small
portion of municipal forests might be under this local popular jurisdiction, and the local self-government
bodies have no state power to manage or make decisions regarding federal forest lands. That said,
however, the bodies of local self-government could rule on the use of what was declared municipal
property, alongside the local state executive authorities.
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going to change it. It covers all spheres of the local authorities, not just the
forestry sphere. And this law gives the right to the raion authorities to
distribute and use the natural resources. …The new system doesn’t work,
and that’s why there are no conflicts so far… People are working now and
production must not wait for the time it takes to develop the new law. That
is why they are still using the old system” (Director of Licensing
Department, 1998a).
Continuing to operate under “the old system,” then, the raion administrators continued
to divide the forest dues between krai and raion budgets, rather than split them 60/40
between the krai and the federal budgets as mandated in the 1997 Forest Code. And,
according to the licensing director, even the old rules are up for flexible intrepretation.
The 1995 krai law legislated that 50 percent of user fees go to the raion non-buget fund,
25 percent to to raion budget, and 25 percent to the krai non-budget fund. In reality,
“…it’s more like 75 percent remains at the raion level and 25 percent goes
to the krai Forest Service. Of the raion’s 75 percent, 25 percent goes to the
leskhoz, and 50 percent goes to pay for the raion’s needs. This is not a rigid
distribution. (and don’t talk about this in scientific material). For instance, if
the raion sees that the leskhoz needs more financial support for
administrative purposes or for fighting fires, or whatever, the raion will give
the leskhoz what it needs” (Director of Licensing Department, 1998b).
In addition to this sizeable share of revenues from dues and lease payments, the raion
administrators continue to collect charges and fees and infrastructure investments from
forest users to shore up the local budget. From 1993 to 1997, the raion administrations
demanded approval of all forest allocations and forest users were required to make
additional payments to the raion, such as social payments to the municipal non-budget
fund or adding as much as $5 per cubic meter to the stumpage fees (Sheingauz, 1998c).
The 1997 Code removed these rights even as the raiony were required to cancel their
non-budget funds. Thus, in addition to frequent trips to the krai administration's offices
in downtown Khabarovsk city to seek financial support, raion administrators now
finance their budgets with now unsanctioned “add ons”. In the course of negotiations for
municipal permits, local administrators continue to charge enterprises with “voluntary”
contributions to the “social fund”, or to solicit additional payments from forest
enterprises, though now only amounting to about $1.50 per cubic meter (Sheingauz,
1998c). Once forest users have been awarded the right to lease a particular forest fund
tract, they still need to register their enterprise with the municipality, get permission to
develop leased tracts and to operate their businesses; permissions often granted in
exchange for much-needed infrastructure investment in roads, hospitals, boilers, or
fuelwood for the community that used to be provided by the LPX. One raion
administrator explained:
“In logging companies’ lease agreements with the leskhoz, it says they have
to provide social support to the raion. Amounts and types of support are
agreed with the leskhoz and the heads of the villages, who let the
administration know what they need. Almost every company has such a
clause saying what type of support they will provide to the village or
raion… and the raion makes the decisions about where to direct their
money, to which villages.”
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The chief of one harvesting joint venture concurred:
“The law says responsibility for the social sphere lies with the municipal
government, but in reality, the boiler and the generator are located at the
camp, and the enterprise located there is responsible for various sections of
town. There was 100 percent resistence from all the people — the local
government, the mayor — nobody wants this burden. We had to meet with
the mayor to get the license signed, so we negotiated somewhat. We agreed
to take over their boiler and firewood, daycare center and the kindergarten.
Had to buy an apartment for some employee. We had to compromise.”
Such “local add-ons” to the municipal budget can take many forms. An executive from
one foreign harvest and export enterprise complained that their authorization for
constructing a new warehouse was held up by a raion official hoping to have a stolen
computer replaced at the expense of the enterprise. His company, he said, contributed
$12,000 for hospital equipment to the district, and pays about 2500 rubles a month to
support the raion kindergartens. Upon winning a large lease competition, the head of
one Malaysian firm went to the raion and gave $100,000 to the administration, re-built
the boiler, bought vehicles for the indigenous Udege community and ambulances for the
hospitals in the district. The general manager of another firm, with headquarters in
Komsomolskii raion and harvest operations in Vannino raion was pressured to pay full
taxes and other fees in both, though technically the enterprise was supposed to pay only
in the raion where it was registered. The head of another firm, also a foreign timber
export enterprise, made a common complaint that all banking information is available to
those who want it, so when a city administrator sees an account with positive economic
turnover, the tax inspectors arrive. During my visit to this enterprise on the seacoast, a
tax inspector arrived one afternoon to collect 43 rubles in taxes levied “for some
technicality” (for comparison at the time, a loaf of bread cost about three rubles; a bottle
of vodka about 26 rubles; a pensioner's monthly wages about 400 rubles). He sat down
for conversation, some vodka and fresh king crab that another visitor had brought in that
day, and after a while left with 43 rubles, which everyone assumed would not make its
way back into the municipal coffers. The head of the enterprise told me that earlier in
the year, the company was visited by the tax inspectors and charged a road tax for a
portable crane on the log yard and loading dock because it had wheels and a steering
wheel; the tax bill, retroactive to 1994 when the enterprise was founded, came to
$100,000, but was not paid out all at once. “Rather, the city got in line once the account
was tapped so they got a certain percentage every month, about $300.” His accountant
complained: “Every time anyone is making any money, everyone shows up at the
door!”
The raion administrations have also maintained their voice in the allocation of land in
the municipality. Federal and provincial laws specify coordination between the raion
and the leskhoz in allocating forest land for short term lease, but the raion
administrators have other more independent ways to allocate land with more direct
returns to the local budget. While the raion can allocate only short-term, small-scale
tracts of forest land (up to 5000 cubic meters per year), enterprises can apply for
permission on several lots, so they may be able to harvest much larger amounts through
a combination of smaller parcels. An administration official explained that:
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“Now the local laws are in force. …The user pays for the harvest permit
issued from the raion, and a raion bank transfers the funds to the krai
budget. But the funds are actually split between the raion and the krai; it
doesn’t all go to the krai. This is a big source of revenue for the local
budgets and a big struggle between the krai and the raion administrations,
especially in (forest rich areas such as) Imini Lazo, Sov Gavan, and
Vannino raiony” (Sheingauz, 1998b).
Local processes of forest allocation have also become flexible. In an article on the
lucrative but illegal business of harvesting ash for export, a writer for the daily regional
newspaper, Priamurskiye Vedomosti (Priamouri Gazette), wrote that “it became known
to all the… enterprises that the requested volumes of forest resources could be easily
received at the raion (Certification) Commissions after promising something”, and as
the prices for ash rose, “implicit bargaining became particularly gainful” (Khoroshilov,
1998). In addition to allocating annual harvesting permits to commercial enterprises,
raion administrators can grant harvest permits for civilian use, mainly to families to
build or repair the hand-crafted wooden houses in which most rural villagers live. Often,
the deputy chief of the raion administration is responsible for approving the villagers’
timber requests and lobbies the provincial administration for new timber permits.
According to Shulyakovskaya (2000) in The St. Petersburg Times, the federal
governmental regulations helped “to concentrate enormous powers in the hands of” the
raion deputy chief. Under the 1997 Forest Code, each villager has the right to cut down
125 cubic meters of timber to build a house, and every three years, each family is
entitled to an additional 20 cubic meters of timber to fix their homes. When villagers
receive their timber-cutting permits, they pay around 12 to 17 rubles per cubic meter of
uncut timber, about 1 percent of the market value. Some local district authorities have
increased the allotted amount of timber to 300 cubic meters, bringing a flood of
villagers — and some revenues — to the administrator’s offices: “From dawn to dusk”,
at the offices of the district administration, Shulyakovskaya writes, “babushkas
(grandmothers) dressed in their very best line up for hours to get their timber requests
signed. The bureaucrats from neighboring, timber-less districts come by, driving
sparkling sport-utility vehicles and escorted by bulky men in track suits to plead for
their own bit of timber ‘pie’ to keep their districts’ own barter cycles going”. The local
returns to negotiated access may take the form of a Toyota Land Cruiser, a cut of the
profits, or simply a few bottles of vodka.
In addition to its changed relationships with the krai and federal governments, the
raions’ horizontal economic relationship with the leskhoz have also changed. Until
1997, the raiony and the leskhoz had essentially separate financing and functions within
the forestry sphere, and generally separate agendas. A krai official distinguished them:
“local administrators strive to improve the economy of the district, think about
employment, and whether enterprises are able to pay their taxes and other payments in
full, including payment of wages to labor. They consider the user as a whole. …The
leskhoz is interested in silviculture, forest use and payments, not labor” (Vachaeva,
1998, p. 2). Both are interested in expanding their budgets.
With the changing locus of control over the forest resources, however, the raion
administrations and the leskhoz now more often compete with each other for the
economic returns to forest use within their respective and overlapping jurisdictions:
“The relationship (between us) is absolutely different now than before”, reflected one
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local administrator. In Soviet times, for instance, payment for the leskhoz’ transfer of
forest land between different categories of use went through the raion’s budget, and
consequently the leskhoz depended on the municipal authorities to pass the funds on to
them (Mikheeva, 1999, p. 10). With the passage of the 1997 Federal Forest Code,
however, many raion administrators were well aware of the Code’s discontinuation of
direct local payments from forest use, and in one district, the administrator simply
refused to transfer fees to the leskhoz' accounts (Mikheeva, 1999, p. 9).
Thus, despite the reforms to the codified system that meant to limit the municipalities’
role in the forestry sector, raion administrators continued to allocate forest lands,
demand social and infrastructure investment from forest users as conditions for working
in the district, and collect revenues from forest users, if not as a share of stumpage fees,
then in the form of taxes or charges for their continued operation in the district. The
leskhoz, facing similar external challenges to their independent authority, have followed
suit with an institutional flexibility to counter political and economic changes, and have
managed to maintain a fair degree of administrative and fiscal autonomy as well as
direct control over the forest resources in their districts. As with the raiony, the leskhoz’
flexibility to accommodate significant financial limitations appears to be a function of
their adaptability to political and economic change, the good fortune of being in a
forest-rich district, and their ability to work apart from the externally codified
organizational system.
4.3 The Leskhoz as Controller
The Russian Federal Forest Service celebrated its two-hundredth anniversary in 1998.
Comprised of a hierarchy of state offices at the federal, provincial, and district levels, it
is the latter, the district-level leskhoz, that is the workhorse in the state management of
federal forest fund lands. The leskhozy are responsible for the use, protection,
monitoring and regeneration of the state forests, which involves the inventory of
growing stock, administering forest fund leases and their documentation, organizing
auctions for short term forest fund use, preparing harvest plans with the forest user,
issuing annual allotments of felling sites and issuing logging tickets and supply orders,
among other responsibilities. The leskhoz used to be divided into minimal
administrative units called lesnichestva (ranger districts) which — where they still exist
— are generally responsible for the execution of forestry operations, including forest
regeneration, prevention and control of forest fires, poaching, pests and disease, and
examining logging sites and areas set aside for other types of forest use (Efremov et al.,
1999, p. 14). In Khabarovsk Krai, there are 44 leskhoz, each of which manages an
average area of 1.6 million hectares. At the end of 1999, some 2,800 people were
employed by the Forest Service in the krai (Efremov et al., 1999, pp. 12–13).
In the late 1960s, the newly created Ministry of Forestry reorganized the leskhoz, which
had been dedicated to forest inspection and protection, into self-financing industrial
units. “So, they began to harvest for money”, one leskhoz director told me; “leskhoz
turned from units of control and environmental support to units that provided income”.
In Soviet times, the leskhoz had three types of financing from two separate accounts: the
forest management account and the industrial account (Sheingauz, 1999). Within the
first, funds came from the central state budget and from the leskhoz’ “own means” and
went exclusively toward forest management, protection, and reforestation. Leskhoz
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earned these “means” by selling tree and garden seedlings, offering services to state
harvesting enterprises, selling timber from thinnings, leasing tractors to the kolkhoz, etc.
The earned revenues comprised about 20 percent of the forest management account,
with the other 80 percent coming from the federal budget. The second account, the
industrial account, was funded by leskhoz’ industrial timber activities. Leskhoz could
sell themselves the timber via the “forest management” account and harvest it via the
“industrial” account. Roads built under the forest management budget provided access
for forest industrial activities, and with revenues earned from their industrial activities,
the leskhoz could build buildings, invest in equipment, maintain transportation
networks, etc.
In 1993, the leskhoz’ industrial account was abolished and they were no longer allowed
to undertake commercial industrial harvesting. In 1997, the federal forest code returned
the leskhoz to being, first and foremost, state forestry management bodies “in the area of
use, conservation, protection, and reproduction of the Forest Fund”, responsibilities
deemed “incompatible with harvest and processing of timber”(Articles 50 and 53).
Forest management continues to be funded by federal and krai sources, as well as the
leskhoz’ “own means”, but under conditions of chronic budget deficit, and with the
increase in the number of users by five to six times, as compared with pre-perestroika
levels, “this (has proved) disastrous for forest management and control” (Minaker and
Mikheeva, 1997, p. 2). In 1997, the federal budget provided only about 40 percent of the
Khabarovsk forest management budget. The krai was supposed to fund reforestation
and salvage operations, “but so far this year”, a director at the Khabarovsk Forest
Service lamented in May, “there has been no money from the krai”.  The leskhoz are
“compelled to search for the deficit funds themselves”, explains the Chief of the
Khabarovsk Forest Service, by selling timber from thinnings or sanitary harvest from
plantation forests within their districts, growing and selling hay, harvesting and selling
mushrooms and berries and other non-timber forest products, renting out equipment and
means of transportation, selling information and services, collecting fines and charging
fees, as well as collecting a percentage of the lease starting payments (Pominov, 1997,
p. 4; Sheingauz, 1999; Antonova, 1998). From 1995 to 1997, the federal budget’s share
of financing forest management activities fell by almost 15 percent, with an increase in
1998 to combat the catastrophic summer fires that consumed more than 2 million
hectares in the krai (United Nations, 1998) (see Table 6). Leskhoz “own means” have
expanded each year, from 8.6 million rubles in 1995 to almost 28 million rubles in
1998, comprising nearly 37 percent of forest management funding before the 1998 fires.
The role of lease payments has also increased as a source of financing for forest
management and in 1997 comprised half of the krai’s non-budget funds for forest
management, though only 12 percent of funding for forest management generally.
“Mostly we are poorly financed from Moscow… so we are largely supported from
money earned and from the krai”, one director told me, adding with a shrug, “We got
our uniforms from Moscow!”
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Table 6. The Structure of Financial Sources for the Forest Sector in Khabarovsk Krai
Volume (000 rubles) Portion, %
Source
1995 1996 1997 1998* 1995 1996 1997 1998*
Federal Budget 20183,0 32508,0 29487,0 53660.5 56,2 49,5 41,4 59.2
“Own Funds” 8637,2 17125,2 26274,8 27941 24,0 26,1 36,8 30.8
Unappropriated
   Budget Funds
7111,8 16039,8 15513,2 9008 19,8 24,4 21,8 9.9
   Including:
   Forest Assessments 3648,7 8955,6 5588,8 4679 10,2 13,6 7,8 5.2
   Lease Payments 1216,2 3846,7 8383,2 3251 3,4 5,9 11,8 3.5
   Fines and
      Forfeitures
Total
2246,9
35932,0
3237,5
65673,0
1541,2
71275,0
1078
90609.5
6,2
100.0
4,9
100.0
2,2
100.0
1.2
100.0
* Note: 1998 only January through September, and includes emergency federal funds to fight the
catastrophic fires of 1998. Source: Khabarovsk Krai Forest Service, 1998; Mikheeva, 1999.
With the 1997 Forest Code, the federal reformers expected that the newly introduced
market mechanisms — competitive allocation of forest fund land — would drive
stumpage fees above the federally-set minimum rates, in turn providing the krai non-
budget funds with sufficient revenue to cover the cost of forest management, protection,
and reforestation. Unfortunately, the government’s market-based approach to financing
public forest management has not worked and revenues from forest use fees are not
enough. “Ni khvatet” (It’s not enough), leskhoz directors insist, “We appear to be in a
market economy, but we are still weak. We have to limit activities that bring in money,
and we have no money to plant or to control forest fires. We don’t have the resources to
operate”. According to a study by the Harvard Institute of International Development
(HIID) on reforestation in Khabarovsk:
“…A functioning and predictable auction system has yet to be introduced on a
broad basis. Experience already suggests that auction prices will not reflect
fair market values for some time…because there is a lack of reliable
information about the resources being auctioned and a lack of competition
among bidders. Both factors depress prices. Plus, high access and production
costs will prevent bid prices from being much higher than the minimum
stumpage fees, even if conditions do become more competitive.
Consequently, auctions have not yet become a significant source of revenue
for the leskhozy” (HIID et al., 1998, pp. 4–8).
Khabarovsk Forest Service officials insist that “stumpage rates are already so high and
the companies are so poor that the leskhoz can't raise the prices”. Further, the forestry
sector is just as rife with non-payments as all other sectors of the economy. Even if the
stumpage fees bid by forest users were above the federally-set minimum rates, the
leskhozy would still be strapped for funding unless a greater share of forest users paid
the assessments that were due (see Table 6) and the krai and raion administrations' non-
budget funds were actually disbursed to support leskhoz’ forest management operations.
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By 1998, the leskhoz financial support from Moscow had dwindled, the krai had
discretion in its distribution of the non-budget funds, the leskhoz faced restrictions on
the generation of its own operating funds, forestry enterprises were not paying their
bills, and raiony were under no obligation to support the leskhoz since expenditure of
the municipal non-budget funds were, in practice, also discretionary, and municipalities
were more likely to support industrial enterprises that provide local jobs, infrastructure,
and pay local taxes.
4.3.1 “If a leskhoz has forests, it has access to financing”
This is not to say, however, that all leskhoz are without financing. Despite the
diminshed finances and the real crisis this has fostered in forest management, I was told:
“(i)f a leskhoz has any forested area in its territory, it has access to financing”
(Shvidenko, 1999). Leskhozy in forest-rich territories have persisted in their practice and
evolved in their means to cope with the lost financial resources from the federal budget,
the krai budget, and their own industrial options. As one forest manager said, “The
economy has become a very difficult science today. The state took care of the forest
establishments before, but today, we get only 12 to 13 percent of the money we need
from the government. The rest we earn ourselves” (Smekalina, 1998).
Though the leskhoz still have many sanctioned forms for earning their “own means”, it
appears that unsanctioned activities do a lot to keep them funded.  In a conversation
with two leskhoz directors, one explained his sources of income: “At the leskhoz we
have beehives. We are making hay to sell to the population. We fish salmon for people
that work at the leskhoz. The (USAID) program gave us a dryer for drying mushrooms
for the local market. And we salt ferns and sell them through a special kiosk”.  When I
asked what percentage of his financing comes from these activities, selling berries and
mushrooms and making hay, he replied “Fifty percent,” at which his colleague laughed,
held up his hand, palm to me, sketched “50” and then added a comma, indicating it is 5
percent, not 50 percent. More likely, I was told more explicitly by others, leskhoz make
ends meet by selling the “thinnings” from harvest on the forest fund lots in their districts
for commercial sale to whomever will buy.
Central among district forest offices’ enduring responsibilities not lost under the 1997
Forest Code is the intermediate harvest of forest lands to boost forest productivity,
“when there are no industrial enterprises available to do the thinning independently”
(Article 91). Intermediate harvest or any other harvest undertaken by the leskhoz in the
context of “forest management work, inventory and planning, research and design
work… harvest of secondary forest resources and …minor forest use” is tax exempt,
and the proceeds go directly into the leskhoz’ accounts, leaving little incentive for the
leskhoz to seek out independent contractors to do the thinning for them (Petrov and
Lobovikov, forthcoming). It is no surprise, one director explained to me, that “instead of
sanitary thinning the leskhoz began to harvest for money… And anyway”, he said, “the
money from stumpage fees is only a small source of financing. The leskhoz have no
choice but to harvest. They can't export the logs — leskhoz are not permitted — but they
can sell to whomever will buy (Khabarovsk Krai Forest Service Official, 1999).
According to one forester, “our sanitary harvesting has increased sevenfold since 1993.
In 1998 alone, forestry officials cut down 1.5 million cubic meters of timber under the
pretense of doing necessary sanitary cuts” (Shulyakovskaya, 2000).
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But the leskhoz have little more than land, and without the equipment for industrial
harvest, they must join forces in an exchange of access for equipment. “The (leskhoz)
Controller goes to the logging company for help because he needs fuel, trucks,
equipment, etc., so how can the Controller control logging? Its like barter”, said one
leskhoz director (Leskhoz Director, 1999).  He explained:
“The leskhoz makes the land available to the logging companies, uses the
leskpromhoz workers and machinery because the leskhoz have none of their
own. The leskhoz pays for the fuel and parts and repairs, etc., and the
leskpromhoz harvests the trees and splits the profits with the leskhoz. …But
there is still not enough revenue to buy new equipment, pay for new aircraft
surveillance in the fire season, so the (management) situation gets worse and
worse… The leskhoz cannot be an industrialized company, but they need to
harvest because they don’t get enough money” (Khabarovsk Krai Forest Service
Official, 1999).
Despite what might appear to be mutual dependency between the leskhoz and the
enterprise, as Shulyakovskaya (2000) writes, “these ‘forestry gods’ have the power, free
from any right of appeal, to decide the life or death for timber producing enterprises.
They issue the forest tickets that set logging quotas for forest industry enterprises”. The
chief foresters decide where logging can take place and where it cannot, whether a
company is allotted a tract with “ripe tall trees close to roads or a remote marshy patch
with few trees and dense bushes”, and how much is available for commercial harvest. In
Khabarovsk, as elsewhere, transportation expenses can run as high as 80 percent of the
production costs for timber, and unexploited tracts near rivers, rail lines, or roads come
at a premium. But with the leskhoz own interest in accessible and marketable timber and
disinterest in the expense of building roads into unexploited territory, forest enterprises
complain that leskhoz foresters allocate only the second-best or dispersed lots to the
forest users, reserving for themselves the most commercially valuable and accessible
tracts. The general director of one foreign joint venture complained, “The lesk hoz
can log now, so they want to give companies Grade 3 forests to work so they can have
access to the Grade 1 forests. If companies get a large area of low-grade forests, they’ll
need to invest in infrastructure and roads, and the leskhoz can follow to get better access
to the higher grade forests”. Enterprises also insist that district rangers’ estimation of
standing volumes are often arbitrary and inflated, and that a commercial harvest below
the estimated stock volumes can simultaneously bring fines for high-grading and for
leaving waste-wood on the lot. Forest rangers have been known to dictate harvest plans
for clearcutting areas despite rules of harvest that would dictate otherwise, providing
fuelwood for the leskhoz and the community. Enterprises complain that the foresters
charge seemingly discretionary harvesting penalties as an added source of income,
moreso to foreign joint ventures, which are viewed as wealthy, than to domestic
harvesting enterprises.
Other leskhoz incomes include under-the-table sales of forest tickets and harvest
permits. Outside of Khabarovsk Krai, in neighboring Irkutsk, “the going price for a
permit is about 30 rubles per cubic meter. But the best export-quality timber can fetch
between $40 and $55 per cubic meter at the local warehouses of a foreign export joint
venture. Sold at about 1,000 rubles per cubic meter, export timber costs no more than a
third of its sale value, bringing in 65 percent profit” (Shulyakovskaya, 2000). In
Khabarovsk, whose ash logs have commanded upwards of $600 per cubic meter on the
Japanese market, unsanctioned permission to log 1000 cubic meters may cost $1000; in
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another instance, the fee was half of that but for only 20 cubic meters. Illicit permission
to log and transport non-ash timber is somewhat less expensive, only about $300–$500
for the documentation.
5. The Local is Occupied: Prevailing Political-Economic
Relationships of Power
Eight years after the central government's decentralization of administrative and
management responsibility to the regions, and the provincial state's broad legislative
efforts to gain direct control over the territory's forest wealth under its jurisdiction, in
Khabarovsk there is a diffuse system of power and multiple locations of state
institutional authority that govern access, use, and control over the forest fund
resources.
As the administrator of Pereyaslavka raion said to me, “Plan is plan. Fact is fact”. While
the changing location and logic of control at the provincial level may be sanctioned by
codified reforms, at the local level, the institutional transformation of the state reflects a
flexibility to work outside the codified challenges to its control of locally-based forest
wealth. Thus, despite the legislated disempowerment of the local state, in Khabarovsk
these institutions have largely persisted in their prior authority and continue to control
the relationships of access and exploitation at the point of interaction with the forest
users. What has emerged, in practice, are multiple locations of authority manifested in
multiple processes of authorization, overlapping jurisdiction, a flexibility and
negotiability of terms at every level of decision-making, and a labrynth of relative
power relationships within the state apparatus that govern the processes of participation.
Where the krai administration has recognized decision-making power on questions and
terms of long term use; raion administrators weigh in on questions of local access and
short-term use and general enterprise operations within the municipality. Leskhoz
directors and foresters do the same in the woods. In this sense, the local is “occupied”;
relative relationships of power held by local state authorities and practiced at the local
level continue to govern access and control over the forest fund resources. The local
state institutions are not, in practice, wholly disempowered and subordinate, but are
instead vested with immediate practical control to establish the terms for exploitation of
the forest fund resources within their territorial jurisdiction.
Regardless of the form of institutional flexiblity that the state has employed to
accommodate to political-economic change – whether by the provincial state's legislated
expansion in response to opportunities from the decentralizing center, or the local states'
unsanctioned morphing of authority in response to external challenges to existing
autonomy — common among them is that each seeks to appropriate control over the
productive raw material wealth and returns to their exploitation within their
jurisdictional territory. What we are seeing is a fragmentation and privatization of the
disaggregated state and its various interests, while still operating within the context of
the state apparatus. The consequent tensions among the state institutions and diffuse
system of authority governing the forestry sector has fostered an environment of
political-economic instability that does not lend itself well to the krai administration's
hopes to embrace capital investment — especially foreign capital investment — and
profit from the globalized trade networks of the Pacific Rim markets.
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Appendix
Selected List of Territorial Normative Acts Governing
the Forestry Sector in Khabarovsk Krai11
1992
“On regulations on the order of forest use procedures on the territory of Khabarovsk
Krai”, June 14, 1992.
“On regulations for a special procedure of assigning the forest fund to harvest and forest
use enterprises”.
“On regulation on forming and use of krai non-budget fund for protection and
regeneration of forest resources”.
“On regulation on preparing and organizing license (concession) tenders”.
“On regulation on procedures of exercising a qualification certification of forest users in
Khabarovsk”. Appendix to the decision by a smaller Soviet, #190, September 25,
1992.
“On rules and regulations for leasing out forests and for forest fund use payments”.
1994
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, April 1994, “On the
regulations pertaining to forest fund lease in Khabarovsk Krai and principles for
the rate of forest dues and rent of forest utilization in Khabarovsk Krai”.
DECISION of the Khabarovsk Krai Duma, of July 28, 1994, No. 64 A, “On regulations
pertaining to preparations for and holding commercial competitions and tenders
for forest fund site leasing and for selling timber on the stump in Khabarovsk
Krai”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai Duma, of October 16, 1994, No. 105, “On the
regulations pertaining to the procedure of and the requirements for Khabarovsk
Krai’s forest fund use for cultural, health improvement, tourist, and sporting
purposes”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai Duma, of October 26, 1994, No. 106, “On the
regulations pertaining to the procedure of forest roads use on the territory of the
Khabarovsk Krai’s forest fund”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai Duma, of October 26, 1994, No. 104, “On the
regulations pertaining to the procedure of and the requirements for Khabarovsk
Krai’s forest fund use research purposes”.
                                                
11
 Efremov et al. (1999); Sekhin (1997); Sheingauz et al. (1996); Sheingauz et al. (1995); Russian-
American Educational-Scientific Center – Fund Eurasia (1999).
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LAW of the Khabarovsk Krai, December 28, 1994, No. 10, “On the Territorial
Commission on Forest Use”.
1995
ORDER of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of February 20, 1995, No. 73-p,
“On allocation of the logging forest fund in 1995” (together with “Plan for the
assignment of the logging forest fund of the Khabarovsk Krai’s forest sites
designated for the needs of the regions for 1995”).
LAW of the Khabarovsk Krai, of March 1, 1995, No. 2, “On leasing of forest fund sites
in Khabarovsk Krai”.
LAW of the Khabarovsk Krai, of March 1, 1995, No. 3, “On the procedure of
Khabarovsk Krai’s forest fund use for the purposes of performing forest
subsidiary uses, procuring secondary forest resources and growing forest resource
plantations”.
DECISION of the Khabarovsk Krai Duma, of April 26, 1995, No. 8, “On the Krai non-
budgetary fund for preservation and regeneration of forest resources”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of June 1, 1995, No. 230,
“On measures to be taken to supply raw material to wood processing enterprises
of the krai”.
LAW of the Khabarovsk Krai, of June 28, 1995, No. 11, “On guidelines for setting rates
of forest dues and of rent charges for forest fund sites use on the territory of
Khabarovsk Krai (the wording of June 25, 1997, revised).
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of July 24, 1995, No. 290,
“On the transference of first category forest lands to non-forest lands for the
purpose of granting them to the Vostok-Energo Far East Energy System
Amalgamation”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of October 30, 1995, No.
428, “On the transfer of first category forest lands to non-forest lands, granting
them to the Nanai Road Construction and Repair Department”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai Duma, of November 29, 1995, No. 144, “On
the proposal of compositional alteration of the membership of the Krai Committee
on Forest Use”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of December 19, 1995,
No. 487, “On rehabilitation of the Krai’s forested areas damaged by winds”.
1996
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of January 15, 1996, No.
24, “On measures to be taken to ensure the protection of forests from fires on the
territory of Khabarovsk Krai in 1996”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of January 15, 1996, No.
25, “On the compositional alteration of the membership of the Krai Committee on
Forest Use and the confirmation of the regulations for its operation”.
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RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of March 18, 1996, No.
126, “On confirmation of principal guidelines for the development of the
Khabarovsk Krai’s forest sector during the period of 1996 to 1998”.
LAW of the Khabarovsk Krai, of March 28, 1996, No. 27, “On the krai non-budgetary
fund for preservation and regeneration of forest resources (the wording of January
27, 1999, revised).
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of May 17, 1996, No. 233,
“On the imposition of a state of emergency on the territory of Khabarovsk Krai in
connection with fire hazard”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of August 6, 1996, No.
380, “On the program for reforestation and forest preservation in Khabarovsk
Krai for the period of 1996 to 2000 and for the period until 2010”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of November 25, 1996,
No. 522, “On the Far East Association of Small Private and Non-Governmental
Forest Use Businesses”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of December 15, 1996,
No. 564, “On measure to straighten out the activities performed by enterprises,
institutions, and individual citizens, related to harvesting, processing, and selling
timber of valuable deciduous species from the territory of Khabarovsk Krai”.
1997
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of February 7, 1997, No.
43, “On the beginning of the preparation for international competitions for a forest
fund site lease right”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of March 27, 1997, No.
115, “On withdrawal of lands out of the Gos-Les fund’s jurisdiction and the
transfer of first category forest lands to non-forest lands”.
LAW of the Khabarovsk Krai, of May 28, 1997, No. 20, “On the procedure of holding
international commercial competitions (tenders) for natural resource use rights in
Khabarovsk Krai”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of August 13, 1997, No.
364, “On approval of the regulations for the procedure of small-volume standing
timber sales in the revised wording”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of August 13, 1997, No.
364, “On the organization of the fire control propaganda system among the
population of the krai for the purpose of lowering the number of areas vulnerable
to hazardous fires”.
1998
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of January 21, 1998, No.
21, “On the confirmation of the price list for the transfer of forested lands into
non-forested ones”.
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RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of February 13, 1998, No.
59, “On fire control measures to be taken on the territory of Khabarovsk Krai in
1998”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of May 18, 1998, No. 217,
“On principal guidelines for the sustainable environmental development of the
‘Gassinski’ Model Forest area during the period of 1998 to 2005 and the status
granted to that area”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of August 4, 1998, No.
304, “On the procedure of charging for timber sold on the stump on the territory
of Khabarovsk Krai”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of November 30, 1998,
No. 456, “On holding auctions for selling valuable and hard-leaved species of
wood”.
“The Khabarovsk Krai Forest Code” of December 25, 1998, No. 87.
1999
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of February 11, 1999, No.
99, “On measures to be taken to ensure the protection of forests from fires on the
territory of Khabarovsk Krai”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of February 22, 1999, No.
81, “On additional measures to be taken by the government to control harvesting,
selling, and exporting valuable wood species timber”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of April 13, 1999, No.
164, “On the procedure of licensing timber harvesting operations in the forest
fund of Khabarovsk Krai”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of April 14, 1999, No.
171, “On the procedure of performing intermediate felling operations on the
territory of Khabarovsk Krai”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of March 26, 1999, No.
129, “On acknowledgement of the invalidation of the Resolution of the Krai
Administration Head”, of June 15, 1998, No. 248, “On contractural timber
harvesting carried out on the rented sites of the forest fund in the territory of
Khabarovsk Krai”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of June 8, 1999, No. 235,
“On the procedure of the replacement of certificates (Attestation) with licenses for
the right to harvest timber in Khabarovsk Krai forest fund”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of June 18, 1999, No. 242,
“On the application of increasing coefficients for the minimum payment rates for
timber to be sold on the stump”.
RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of June 22, 1999, No. 245,
“On the quotas of subsidiary use of the forest to satisfy citizens’ personal needs on
the territory of Khabarovsk Krai”.
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RESOLUTION of the Khabarovsk Krai administration head, of June 22, 1999, No. 247,
“On additional measures to be taken to improve the Krai’s forest industrial sector
management”.
Selected List of Federal Acts Governing the
Forestry Sector in the Russian Federation
“Russian Fundamentals of Forestry Act”, adopted by the State Duma of the Russian
Federation, March 6, 1993.
ORDER of the Government of the Russian Federation, No. 712, July 23, 1993,
“Regulation on the Forest Land Lease in the Russian Federation”.
“Forest Code of the Russian Federation”, adopted by the State Duma of the Russian
Federation, January 22, 1997.
ORDER of the Federal Forest Service of Russia, No. 99, August 11, 1997, “On
confirmation of the statute of regulations on holding timber auctions”.
RESOLUTION of the Government of the Russian Federation, September 19, 1997, No.
40, Article 4587, “On minimum payment rates for standing timber bought on the
stump”.
ORDER of the Federal Forest Service of Russia, No. 123, September 30, 1997, “On
approval of the statute of forest competition regulations for assignment of Russian
Federation forest stock parcels for leasing”.
LETTER from the Federal Forest Service of Russia, No. Mg-1-17-3/8, January 16,
1998, “On some issues pertaining to the organization of forest use activities in
1998”.
ORDER of the Federal Forest Service of Russia, No. 55 of April 8, 1998, “On
procedures of assigning forest fund parcels for lease”.
Sources: Sekhin, N. (1997); Sheingauz, A.S. et al. (1995); Russian-American
Educational-Scientific Center – Fund Eurasia (1999).
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Box A1: Powers of Local Authority under the 1993 Fundamentals
Responsibility granted to local government authorities and district Soviets of People’s
Deputies in the sphere of forestry.
• Participation in the writing of federal and regional forestry development programs.
• Coordination, with the provincial government, of the principles of fixing the rates
and amounts of forest tax (dues) and rental charges for the use of forest stock.
• Fixing rates and amounts of forest tax (dues) and rental charges, granting
exemptions to some categories of use, and deciding on forms of payment of tax and
rental charges.
• Adoption, jointly with the leskhoz, of decisions to allot forest stock for long term
use (lease), with the participation of decisions being limited to defining the
conditions in conformity with established forestry requirements.
• Control of the use, reproduction, conservation, and protection of forests.
• Decision on the forms of selection of forest users (direct negotiations, forest tenders,
competitive bidding).
• Restriction, suspension, or termination of the right to use forest stock.
• Forest fund inventory.
• Allocation of the established cutting and felling limit to forest users, in conformity
with the recommendations of the state forest service, including the delivery of
timber for state needs.
• Fire control measures and protection against pests and disease.
• Forest regeneration and protection, and collaboration on environmental protection
(cleaning sites, protecting the water during logging, observing the rules of harvest,
etc.) with state agencies for environmental protection.
• Collaboration with owners of the forest fund (leskhoz) on decisions allocating forest
tracts for short term use.
• Limiting, suspending, or canceling the rights for forest fund use.
• Organizing and implementing forest tenders and competitive bidding for the
allocation of forest stock into use, with the participation of the leskhoz.
Source: 1993 Fundamentals of Forest Legislation of the Russian Federation, Articles 6 and 7.
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Box A2: Basic Functions of the 1994 Krai Commission on Forest Use
(Chapter 2, Article 4)
1. Working out and consideration of the regional programs on forest management and
development
2. Consideration of the programs of scientific research on forest resources and on possibilities
of their future use on the Khabarovsk territory.
3. Making proposals on changes and additions to statues and ordinances on forest use in the
organs of krai legislative power.
4. Evaluation of the modern state of the forest fund and forest use in the territory.
5. Consideration of proposals and preparation of the decisions and proposals on approving the
limits of forest parcels between forest users of the territory of all forms of property (state,
private, etc). taking into consideration proposals made by the territory or city organs of local
authority and taking into consideration different parcels in different forest groups.
6. Preparation of proposals on redistribution of limits of forest parcels in case they are not
utilized or in case the forest users have not met the requirements on use of the given
resources.
7. Preparation of recommendations on improvement of forest resource use in the territory and
on rational/reasonable organization of forest use.
8. Attest to scientific research and manufacturing organizations in enterprises in
establishments which implement forest use for scientific purposes.
9. The general coordination of enterprise activity which indulge in questions of forest use,
protection and reproduction of forest resources, studying/investigation of their state, and
control of their forest management and forest production.
10. Preparation, consideration and submitting to the territory admin and local authorities of
proposals on limitations, temporary and final end to enterprise activity, organizations and
private firms which damage the forest fund.
11. Making proposals to the legislative power organs of the territory about processes of forest
use on the territory of the forest fund with specific regime of forest management in the
territories of the local minorities of the North and the Amur territories.
12. Consideration of materials on leasing the forest parcels for rent of plots greater than 2500 ha
from which more than 5000 m3 must be produced each year, and on this parcel more than 5
tons of non-forest food resources.
13. Preparation after agreement with local authorities of proposals of the territorial
administration about leasing forest plots for rent to foreign legal entities/persons and
enterprises with foreign investment.
14. Making proposals to forest fund owners and forest users about changes in the contract
project about renting parcels.
15. Organization of holding commercial competitions about leasing the forest fund for rent
according to the “Statue on Preparation and Holding of Commercial Competitions and
Bidding on Leasing on Forest Fund for Rent and Selling the Timber in the Khabarovsk
Territory” which was approved by the Khabarovsk Krai duma.
16. Consideration of debatable questions and conflict situations while implementing forest use
on the territory and making decisions on them.
17. Making public the questions of state use and protection of forest.
Source: Law of Khabarovsk Krai, No. 10, December 28, 1994, “Concerning the Krai Committee on
Forest Use”, adopted by the Khabarovsk Krai Duma Decree No. 142, December 28, 1994; published in
Priamorski Vedomosti, January 21, 1995.
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Box A3: 1995 Khabarovsk Krai Principles on Determining Forest Duties
and Lease Payment Rates for Forest Use
System of payment terms and concessions:
• High, species specific coefficients for ash and Korean pine are adopted;
• The payment rate for timber is doubled for short-term use;
• When exercising principle cuts by non-clearcut method, tariffs are reduced by 20
percent;
• When wood is removed during intermediate harvest (thinning), tariffs are reduced
by 50 percent;
• If the forest allocated for harvest is situated on mountain slopes with a steepness of
20 degrees or more, tariffs are reduced by 40 percent;
• While working in forests damaged by fire, insects, fungus, diseases, in locations
with rolled timber slash (wind breaks), wind blowdown, dead standing trees, tariffs
can be reduced depending on a loss of technical qualities of wood, by a decision of
the district administrations based on information provided by leskhozy with regard
to local conditions of wood sales;
• Mark-ups are added to the lease payment depending on the period of the lease: one
to five years – 46 percent of the assessed value (payment plus rent) of one cubic
meter of timber; six to twenty-five years – 40 percent; twenty-six to fifty years – 35
percent;
• The rate of payment for the lease of non-timber forest products is set based upon an
assessed value (payment plus rent) of the potential volume of resource on the leased
territory;
• In cases where the lease holder takes responsibility for conducting other “timber
business works” and services, the rate of payment for the sections of the forest
leased can be reduced equivalent to the cost of such work;
• If new technologies are introduced to improve environmental and forest
management conditions when using the forest fund, lease payments can be reduced
(amount of concession not stipulated in the law);
•  When facilities are built to harvest and process forest products at sites that are once
again being developed, the payment can be reduced to 10 percent over the period
needed to put production capacity for the deep timber processing into operation;
• The lease payment for simultaneously using several resources can be lowered to 20
percent when a single operator undertakes integrated use of forest resources on a
lease site;
• With the exception of commercial timber harvest, payments for integrated use of
forest resources on territories of traditional nature use for indigenous peoples of the
north are reduced.
Source: On Principles of Determining Forest Duties and Lease Payment Rates for Use of Timber
Resources in Khabarovsk Krai, Law #4 11, June 28, 1995, in Sekhin (1997) p. 4.
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Box A4: Distribution of Functions on Forest Use Management
According to 1997 Forest Code of Russian Federation
Powers of Russian Federation in the use,
control, and protection of the Forest Fund
and forest reproduction
(Article 46)
Powers of the Russian Federation Subjects
in the use, conservation, and protection of
the Forest Fund and forest reproduction
(Article 47)
Determining the principle directions of State forest
management policy.
Developing and adopting Federal laws and other
standard legal documents of the Russian Federation
and verifying compliance with them.
Ownership, use, and disposition of the Forest Fund.
Following a uniform investment policy in the area
of use, conservation, and protection of the Forest
Fund and forest reproduction.
Developing, approving, and implementing Federal
programs for the use, conservation, and protection
of the Forest Fund and forest reproduction.
Organizing and establishing an order of the activity
of the Federal body of the forest administration and
its territorial agencies.
Establishing the order of dividing the Forest Fund
by groups of forests, for dividing first-group forests
by protection categories, transferring forests from
one group to another, and first-group forests from
one protection category to another.
Establishing standards and rules for use of the
Forest Fund.
Establishing and approving the annual allowable
cut.
Establishing types of payment for use of the Forest
Fund, and minimum payment rates for sold standing
timber.
Establishing the order of making parcels of the
Forest Fund available for use.
Approving rules for making available sold standing
timber, felling operations, conservation and
protection of the Forest Fund, and forest
reproduction.
Organizing and coordinating scientific research and
engineering work in the area of forest management.
Implementing State inspection of use, control, and
protection of the Forest Fund and forest
reproduction, and establishing the order for such
control.
Establishing the order of and organizing State
accounting of the Forest Fund, record-keeping of
the State forest cadastre, forest monitoring and
forest inventory and planning.
Implementing international cooperation of the
Russian Federation in the sphere of use, control, and
protection of the Forest Fund and forest
reproduction.
Developing, approving and implementing territorial
State programs for the use, conservation, and
protection of the Forest Fund and forest
reproduction.
Developing and adopting laws and other standard
legal documents of the Subjects of the Russian
Federation.
Participating in exercising the rights of ownership,
use and disposition of the Forest Fund on the
territory of the relevant Subjects of the Russian
Federation.
Participating in developing and implementing
Federal programs for the use, control, and
protection of the Forest Fund and forest
reproduction.
Adopting decisions on making parcels of the Forest
Fund available for lease, free-of-charge use, and
short term use in accordance with this Code.
Establishing the boundaries of parcels of the Forest
Fund with a special forest management and forest
use regime in areas traditionally inhabited by small
numbers of native populations and ethnic
communities.
Establishing rates for forest fees and leasing rates
(except for minimum rates of payment for sold
standing timber), as well as the rate of payment for
converting forest lands into non-forest lands.
Implementing State inspection of the condition, use,
control, and protection of the Forest Fund and forest
reproduction.
Suspending, restricting, and terminating operations
that are hazardous to the condition and reproduction
of forests.
Organizing measures to protect forests from fires,
pests, and diseases.
Organizing training, education, and instruction of
the population in the area of use, conservation,
protection and reproduction of forests.
Providing the population with the necessary
information on issues concerning the use,
conservation, protection and reproduction of forests.
Converting forest lands into non-forest lands for
purposes unrelated to forest management and use of
the Forest Fund, and (or) withdrawing lands of the
Forest Fund in second- and third-group forests.
Other powers not delegated to the Russian
Federation.
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Concluding and organizing implementation of
international treaties of the Russian Federation in
the sphere of use, conservation, and protection of
the Forest Fund and forest reproduction.
Establishing the procedure for State statistical
accounting in the area of forest management.
Suspending, restricting, and terminating rights to
use parcels of the Forest Fund, and suspending,
restricting and terminating operations that are
hazardous to the condition and reproduction of
forests.
Converting forest lands into non-forest lands for
purposes unrelated to forest management and use of
the Forest Fund and (or) withdrawing lands of the
Forest Fund in first-group forests.
Declaring parcels of the Forest Fund ecological
emergency zones and ecological disaster zones
Other powers granted to the Russian Federation by
the Constitution of the Russian Federation and by
Federal laws.
